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Abstract
Millions of people in the US have direct experience with the machinery of immigration
enforcement or criminal courts, and millions more have seen family members, friends, or
neighbors face these experiences. What do these experiences mean for political behavior in
the United States? Do these proximate observers decide that government is a dangerous
and capricious force to be avoided, and withdraw from political participation entirely? Or is
there sometimes a mobilization response, where some people organize to push back against
what they see as unjust government actions?
This is an important policy feedback story. Large-scale punitive policies could either “lock
themselves in" via community disengagement, or hasten their own demise by fueling political
responses. The three papers of this dissertation examine policies at varying distances (people
living in an area where the policy is introduced, those directly affected, and those living with
people directly affected), and with different timeframes and geographic coverage. The results
of these papers, and the approach of using administrative datasets and finding causal leverage
from “natural experiments," point us toward a new understanding of policy feedbacks.
In the first paper, I find that Latino voters living in counties where a new deporta-
tion program was introduced before the 2010 election became more likely to vote. This
effect seems driven not by personal experience seeing deportation activities, but by activists
mobilizing voters in affected counties.
In the second paper, I use random courtroom assignment to measure the causal effect of
short jail sentences (from misdemeanor cases) on voting. I find that even short jail sentences
can deter people from voting in the next election, with particularly large effects among black
iii
voters.
In the third paper, I find that the household members of incarcerated people also become
several percentage points less likely to vote. This finding is particularly striking given the
narrow scope of the effect measured: this is only the additional effect of seeing a house-
hold member jailed for a short period, among a set of people that have already seen their
household member arrested and charged with a crime.
iv
| Contents
Abstract iii
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
1 When Threat Mobilizes:
Immigration Enforcement and Latino Voter Turnout 6
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Data and Methodological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Possible Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Discussion/Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2 Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement?
The demobilizing effects of brief jail spells on potential voters 35
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3 Locking Up The Vote:
Household spillover effects of incarceration 70
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Incarceration and Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3 Using Administrative Data to Measure Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A Appendix to Chapter 1: Testing Assumptions/ Robustness Tests 86
B Appendix to Chapter 1: Analysis of Record Submissions 93
C Appendix to Chapter 1: Additional CCES Analysis 96
v
D Appendix to Chapter 2: Random Assignment to Courtrooms 99
E Appendix to Chapter 2: Table of Courtroom Caseloads 103
F Appendix to Chapter 2: Regression Table from Figure 2.2 104
G Appendix to Chapter 2: Map of Harris County 105
H Appendix to Chapter 2: Identifying Hispanic Defendants by Surname 106
I Appendix to Chapter 3: Checking for Household Relationships 108
J Appendix to Chapter 3: Including Fixed Effects and Census Data 109
K Appendix to Chapter 3: Instrumental Variables 111
Bibliography 113
vi
| Acknowledgments
Many thanks to the members of my dissertation committee: Claudine Gay, who is a
remarkable advisor and scholar and always gets straight to the heart of the matter in the
most helpful possible way; Jennifer Hochschild, who keeps me looking at the big picture and
never fails to point out something I hadn’t thought of; and Ryan Enos, who has taught me
to read my own and others’ research with a critical eye but always to be constructive, and
who was able to hear my voice when, as a first-year graduate student, I wasn’t sure I had
anything to say.
Thanks to my fellow students, especially the members of my cohort, whose company
brightened my graduate school experience daily. Special thanks to the people whose kindness
made me feel as though I did belong in this field when I wasn’t so sure: Kris-Stella Trump,
Andy Hall, Bernard Fraga, Chris Lucas, Connor Huff, and many others.
My work has been generously supported by grants from the Harvard Center for American
Political Studies, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Malcolm Wiener Center for
Inequality and Social Policy, the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, the Radcliffe
Institute, and Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences.
Many people read portions of the dissertation or watched presentations and offered help-
ful comments: Asad Asad, Angie Bautista-Chavez, Matt Blackwell, Peter Bucchianeri, Ryan
Enos, Julie Faller, Bernard Fraga, Claudine Gay, Alan Gerber, Simo Goshev, Adam Glynn,
Jennifer Hochschild, Dan Hopkins, Connor Huff, Gary King, Christopher Lucas, Michael
Morse, Noah Nathan, Kay Schlozman, Rob Schub, Anton Strezhnev, Kris-Stella Trump,
and the participants of the Harvard Experiments Working Group, the Harvard American
vii
Politics Research Workshop, the Harvard Working Group in Political Psychology, the Har-
vard Inequality Proseminar, and the Yale CSAP conference 2015.
I especially thank my dissertation group, Julie Faller, Noah Nathan, and Rob Schub,
who have read my work tirelessly and always made it better than I could have imagined.
All three of them were able to conduct their own research and then turn their attention just
as effectively to reading about something totally different. They never cease to amaze me
with their humor and generosity and general brilliance, and I am so proud of all they’ve
done and look forward to seeing what’s next.
Finally, I thank Matt and my family, who have never doubted me for a minute, as
infuriating as that can be. I have been incredibly lucky to have their love and support.
viii
| Introduction
Large numbers of people are targeted for punitive government actions in the US. De-
portations have reached record levels in the past few years, with hundreds of thousands of
people deported each year. Incarceration rates have plateaued, but are still higher in the
US than at any other point in history and far surpass those of other developed countries.
Millions of people have direct experience with the machinery of immigration enforcement
or criminal courts, and millions more have seen family members, friends, or neighbors face
these experiences.
What do these experiences mean for political behavior in the United States? Do these
proximate observers decide that government is a dangerous and capricious force to be
avoided, and withdraw from political participation entirely (Soss 1999; Weaver and Ler-
man 2010)? Or is there sometimes a mobilization response, where some people organize to
push back against what they see as unjust government actions (Moore 1978; Klandermans
1997)?
This question matters not only because of the scale of punitive systems in the United
States, but also the concentration of these experiences: many Americans live in neighbor-
hoods where arrests are rare, while others experience police searches and arrests. For many,
immigration enforcement is a distant, abstract concept, while others live in daily fear that
non-citizen family members could be deported. These punitive experiences are dispropor-
tionately concentrated in low-income neighborhoods and those with many minority residents
(Western 2006; Burch 2013).
There is a crucial policy feedback story here. If punitive policies cause a political and
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civic withdrawal among those most affected, it may become harder and harder for these
communities to mount a political response. Policies may become more entrenched as the
people they target drop out of the political system. Conversely, if punitive policies mobilize
people in opposition, they may not last as long as otherwise expected. Do large-scale punitive
policies “lock themselves in" via community disengagement, or do they instead sow the seeds
of their own demise by fueling political responses?
A general answer to this question probably does not exist, and research in this area
has found mixed results (Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Walker 2014; Burch 2013).
Policy effects likely differ based on a few dimensions: who is targeted by the policy, and
how many political resources do they have already? How close are people to the experience
(presumably seeing a neighbor or acquaintance arrested is different from seeing a husband
arrested, both in the strength of reaction evoked and the personal costs taken on)? How
are the policies themselves implemented, and how successfully do they stigmatize the people
targeted? How individualized or collective does the punishment feel, and do people who see
others affected think that they might be next?
This dissertation looks at different policy arenas and at different levels of analysis, as
a first step towards a broader theory of political response. The three papers that follow
look at two different policies (incarceration for misdemeanor crimes, and one component of
federal immigration enforcement), at different distances (people living in an area where the
policy is introduced, those directly affected, and those living with people directly affected),
and with different timeframes and geographic coverage.
The first paper of this project measures voter turnout in response to immigration enforce-
ment. I examine how Latino voters respond to the implementation of a stricter immigration
enforcement regime in their county. I use the staggered rollout of the federal Secure Com-
munities program, which increased immigration-status checks in local jails and ultimately
increased deportations in affected counties, as a source of exogenous variation in immigra-
tion enforcement. I then examine the voter turnout of Latino citizens, who are by definition
not the targets of deportation policies (though they are likely to know or be related to
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people who could be deported). Still, I find a sizeable short-term effect in turnout, with
Latino citizens actually becoming more likely to turn out to vote in the immediate wake of
program implementation. This (possibly counterintuitive) effect seems to be driven not by
personal experience with deportation activities, but by activists mobilizing to get out the
vote in affected counties. At a distance and when dealing with the short-term threat of such
a policy change, people can indeed be mobilized by punitive policies.
The second paper of the dissertation measures individual-level political effects of in-
carceration, focusing on individuals who are sent to jail for short periods in misdemeanor
criminal cases. By linking administrative databases on criminal sentencing and voter reg-
istration and turnout from Harris County, Texas, I observe people’s court experiences and
their later voting behavior. I use the random assignment of cases to different courtrooms
(with varying degrees of sentencing harshness) as a source of exogenous variation in jail
sentencing (Kling 2006; Green and Winik 2010; Mueller-Smith 2014). This allows me to
identify the causal effect of jail on voter turnout, avoiding concerns about omitted variables.
I find that even short jail sentences can deter people from voting in the next election. The
effects differ starkly by race, with essentially no demobilization of white defendants and a
large (about 13 percentage points) drop in voter turnout among black defendants sentenced
to jail. I find observational evidence that at least part of this difference in the effect of
jail is driven by racial differences in who is arrested. In this case, punitive contact with
government can lead to political withdrawal on a large scale.
The third paper focuses on household-level spillover effects of incarceration. Using crim-
inal court records from Harris County, along with the geographic information provided in
the voter file, I construct a dataset of household-level experiences with the criminal justice
system, following voters whose household members have faced misdemeanor charges. As in
the second paper, random assignment to criminal courtrooms adds a source of exogenous
variation to these sentences, allowing me to determine whether exposure to harsher sen-
tences (meted out to one’s family or roommates) makes one less likely to turn out to vote in
the next election. I find that people who saw a household member incarcerated for a short
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period (for a misdemeanor, not a felony crime) become several percentage points less likely
to vote in the next election. This finding is particularly striking given the narrow scope of
the effect measured: this is only the additional effect of seeing a household member jailed
for a short period, among a set of people that have already seen their household member
arrested and charged with a crime.
The second and third sections of the dissertation tell a story of political withdrawal, while
the first paper finds evidence of political mobilization (both voting and activist activity) in
the wake of punitive policies. This raises more questions about the types of policies examined
and the time frame of the studies, but also helps us begin to determine the bounds of punitive
policies’ political effects. First, the project reinforces the idea that the effects of punitive
policies depend on context, and can run in either direction. But it also allows us to theorize
about when these policies will mobilize. Taken together, these results suggest that some
distance is needed from the policy before the mobilizing effects of threat begin to outweigh
the personal costs of the policy. And they point to the role of activists in structuring political
responses. Future work will examine other policy realms and other possible spillover effects.
The contributions of this project are threefold. First, it examines a classic question of
American politics–why do some people participate while others don’t?–from a different angle,
taking into account punitive experiences with government. I am able to do this through the
use of previously unavailable or unmanageable administrative data. This project uses novel
sources of data on both participation and government interactions. Large individual-level
datasets on turnout allow us to know more than ever before about the characteristics,
relationships, and geographic locations of voters, while public records from some states
trace “treatments" such as incarceration and deportation. These new approaches allow me
to answer questions about political experiences that were previously unobservable, and to
use natural variation in these experiences to find causal effects.
Finally, this project is timely not only because of the current availability of data, but
because of the current policy climate in the United States. The experiences I study (depor-
tation, arrests, incarceration) are taking place at historically high levels. If they shape the
4
political behavior of not only the people directly targeted, but also their families, friends,
and neighbors, the total political impact of these policies could be enormous.
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1 | When Threat Mobilizes:
Immigration Enforcement and Latino Voter Turnout
1.1 Introduction
The United States has deported over 360,000 people each year since 2008. Research from
sociology, law, public health, and other disciplines suggests that these deportations affect
the lives of the families, friends, and neighbors deportees leave behind in numerous ways.
This paper seeks to test whether deportations, or the policies that permit them, also affect
the political lives of citizens who live near potential deportees.
It may seem counterintuitive to study the effects of deportation policy on voters, who by
definition are citizens and cannot be deported. However, many Latino citizens live in families
or communities with mixed immigration status, so voters could still view enforcement as a
threat.1 A recent Pew survey found that one in five Latino registered voters (20%) knew
someone who had been deported or detained in the past year. Further, a majority of
Latino registered voters surveyed disapproved of the Obama administration’s deportation
policies (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel 2011). This suggests that a large number
of potential voters are being impacted by enforcement policies with which they disagree.
For voters in families or neighborhoods that include undocumented residents, the threat or
actual experience of seeing their family members, friends, or neighbors face detention or
1Latino citizens are not the only ones who could be exposed to fears of deportation second-hand. But
it seems like a fairly common experience for Latinos, and focusing on a smaller group rather than all
voters makes it easier to see small changes in turnout. Further, Latinos (including registered voters) report
highly unfavorable views of deportation, which should make the immigration enforcement “treatment" more
straightforward for this group of voters than for others with more mixed views (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera,
and Motel 2011).
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deportation could affect their political behavior. Further, activist mobilization in the wake
of policy changes could turn out voters who are not personally aware of them. However,
there is little research linking this experience to voter turnout.2
This paper seeks to measure the short-term impacts of stricter immigration enforcement
measures on Latino voter turnout, using variation in the implementation of the Secure
Communities program. I show that this program, which ultimately led to large increases in
deportations and removals in counties where it was implemented, also immediately increased
Latino voter turnout in treated jurisdictions by several percentage points. I supplement the
simplest approach – comparing turnout changes in treated places to those in untreated
places – with a quasi-experimental approach that takes advantage of exogenous variation in
the timing of program rollout. When I restrict the analysis only to jurisdictions that were
not enrolled in the Secure Communities program as of the 2010 general election, as well as
those jurisdictions that were enrolled by a state decision rather than any local willingness
to participate in the program, the effect remains: Secure Communities enrollment increases
Latino voter turnout by several percentage points.
My design isolates the short-term effects of enrollment in Secure Communities, focusing
on jurisdictions that were enrolled in the program only a few months before the 2010 election.
This limits the direct effects of the program, as very few people would face deportation
before the election. Instead, this design allows me to capture just the “threat" effects of
Secure Communities, such as voters’ response to hearing about program implementation or
activists’ responses to enrollment. I present additional survey evidence that Latino voters
in “treated" jurisdictions (those enrolled in Secure Communities by their state) were more
likely to be personally asked to vote, and to report turning out to vote, than Latinos in
untreated places.
This result contributes to our understanding of how groups can be mobilized in response
2There is some work linking policy and treatment of Latinos to voter behavior, such as Bowler, Nicholson,
and Segura (2006) and Barreto and Woods (2005). But my contention is that immigration policies could
be shaping political behavior even in the absence of political rhetoric about one party’s hostility toward
Latinos, simply because of actual government actions.
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to threat, demonstrating that political responses can arise even when voters themselves
are not the targets of threatening policy. Immigration policy not only has unintended
consequences, but has “second-hand" effects on people who were not actually targeted by
the policy. These effects appear to be at least partly driven by activist mobilization such
as volunteer get-out-the-vote efforts. Although long-term implementation of deportation
policies could also have demobilizing effects, there is a reservoir of Latino political power for
activists to draw on in the face of such programs.3
This finding also adds to our knowledge about immigration enforcement specifically, by
demonstrating that this enforcement has political implications. These results would seem to
suggest that politicians stake out strict immigration stances at their own peril. But there
is an interesting paradox at play: the unprecedented levels of deportation discussed in this
paper, and much of the expansion of programs such as Secure Communities, have mainly
taken place under a Democratic administration. Many new Latino voters are casting votes
for Democrats. The partisan dynamics of immigration enforcement are not straightforward,
and this paper raises questions of how immigration policy debates and a growing Latino
citizen population will reshape the electoral landscape in the years to come.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Immigration Enforcement as a “treatment"
Over two million people have been removed from the US since 2008, many of them
under the auspices of relatively new police-driven programs such as Secure Communities
and 287(g) agreements (Kohli, Markowitz, and Chavez 2011). These federal programs have
created, or at least exacerbated, a sense among undocumented residents that they are at
risk of detention or deportation whenever they go out in public, and that police officers are
now looking for excuses to stop and possibly arrest them (Capps 2011). If these programs
3Having family members face deportation, for example, could mean that voters have less time, energy,
or money available for electoral activities. Further, having negative interactions with an uncaring and
bureaucratic government could turn off voters (Soss 1999; Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010).
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have raised the profile of immigration enforcement actions, greatly increased distrust of
government in targeted communities, and created a sense of unfair deportation (of people
with families in the US and no history of criminal behavior, for example), then they should
have larger effects on political behavior than earlier enforcement actions.
Over the last two decades, immigration enforcement has become more interior-focused,
removing many people who are not near any borders and have lived in the U.S. for many
years (Waters and Simes 2013). These people are more likely to have established family and
community ties in the U.S. than recent migrants, and their removal is more likely to affect
the political behavior of citizens. Removals have also drastically increased overall: in 1986,
there were 24,592 removals, while by 1996 there were 69,680. In 2006, there were 280,974
removals, and in all years since 2007 that number has exceeded 300,000 (US. Department
of Homeland Security 2012). Some of these represent repeated deportations of the same
individuals, but it still appears that many people are being deported from an increasingly
broad geographic area.
One of the programs that have fueled this huge increase in deportations, and the shift
from border- to interior-focused enforcement, is the Secure Communities program.4 Under
Secure Communities agreements, the fingerprints of people arrested by local law enforcement
are shared with ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and checked against their
immigration database. If the arrestee is “removable" (does not have legal status or has a
criminal record that includes crimes for which even legal residents are deportable) ICE can
then decide whether to issue a detainer and begin removal proceedings (Kohli, Markowitz,
and Chavez 2011). This approach means that ICE checks the immigration status of many
more people than before. ICE will be able to begin removal procedures for people who
previously would have gone unnoticed by agents, such as those that are arrested but are
not ultimately imprisoned in the state or federal prisons where agents had been checking
inmates’ status. The Secure Communities program was first piloted in several major cities in
4Another such program was the 287(g) program, which trained and deputized local police to perform
immigration enforcement duties. Having such a program in place neither prevented nor guaranteed Secure
Communities implementation in a city or county.
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2008, and has since been rapidly expanded to include most of the country. It was expected
to cover the entire country by the end of 2013 (Hampton 2012).
The Secure Communities program is expected to have several relevant effects on commu-
nities where it is implemented. Most obviously, it will lead to more immigration detention
and more deportations in the long term. But other things are likely to happen in the im-
mediate wake of program implementation: the local media (particularly Spanish-language
outlets) may report on the program’s implementation, and word may also spread through
informal social networks (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011). Immigration activists may
also publicize the program as a threat to the community, and local churches and civic organi-
zations can provide sites for this publicity, as has happened in the wake of other immigration
crackdowns (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011). In some places, activists have organized
to oppose the program, forming national networks of protesters and holding meetings, rallies,
and conferences (Strunk and Leitner 2013). It is worth considering this entire “treatment"
when discussing mechanisms by which the program could affect turnout. This paper focuses
on a relatively short window of time between Secure Communities enrollment and the 2010
election, during which the program is unlikely to have led to a large number of completed
(or even begun) deportations. Therefore, the main impact of the policy during this time
frame will be due to other components of the policy, such as public awareness of enrollment
and activist responses to the program.
1.2.2 Immigration enforcement and voter turnout
The literature on Latino voter behavior and turnout contains several results that might
predict an increase in turnout after the introduction of a program like Secure Communities,
although there is little work on the effects of immigration enforcement in particular. Several
studies of Latino turnout in response to threatening policy environments, in particular, have
found that contentious policy proposals can lead to changes in political behavior. Barreto
and Woods (2005) examines voter turnout (among registered Latino voters) in Los Angeles
after several years of policy proposals and hostile public discourse targeting Latinos, finding
10
that voter turnout rose over this period. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006) argues that
ethnically-divisive politics in California during the 1990’s also led to changes in partisanship
for both Latino and Anglo voters. The finding that non-Latino voters were affected by
policies (such as ending affirmative action and bilingual education) that didn’t directly
target them foreshadows this paper’s finding of Latino citizens responding to a policy that
targets only noncitizens.5 This paper builds on prior work by looking at a new federal
immigration policy, using broader geographic data, and focusing on short-term policy effects
in the absence of heated rhetoric.
Other related studies focus on first-generation immigrants. Pantoja, Ramirez, and Se-
gura (2001) suggests that Latino immigrants who naturalized in a state context of threat
(California in the 1990’s) were more likely to vote. The naturalization process–and the
idea of naturalizing in response to threat–cannot explain this study’s results, as the time
frame is too short for immigrants to have responded to policy changes by naturalizing and
voting. However, these results are consistent with the idea that people could be mobilized
to vote by threatening government action. Similarly, Ramakrishnan (2005) finds that state
contexts of threat (measured by discussion of anti-immigrant measures) are associated with
higher self-reported turnout by naturalized immigrants of all backgrounds. Because I fo-
cus on public records of voting, I cannot address the question of whether first-generation
Latino immigrants drive the turnout effect I find among all Latino voters; I do not have
information on people’s place of birth. But recently-naturalized immigrants could be more
responsive to some of the mechanisms discussed below, and might drive the effects I find.
This is especially likely in the realm of immigration policy: Branton (2007) notes that first-
generation immigrants prefer less restrictive immigration policies than other Latinos, so they
may be more likely to object to the Secure Communities program. Further, Branton et al.
(2015) found that responses to the 2006 immigrant rights protests varied by generational
status, with first-generation immigrants the most affected. Any such mobilization among
5Other related work focuses on the mobilizing effects of threat on other ethnic groups, such as Cho,
Gimpel, and Wu (2006)’s discussion of high-SES Arab-Americans’ political mobilization after 9/11.
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first-generation immigrants could vary by citizenship status or national origin (Fraga et al.
2012), as well as political attachments in their country of origin (Wals 2011, 2013).
The studies just described suggest that Secure Communities could increase aggregate
voter turnout. There are several mechanisms by which individual voters could be induced
to turn out. First, they might respond to the policy of their own accord, either because
they see deportations taking place (unlikely in this study), or because they hear about
the policy’s implementation. Alternatively (or additionally), voters might be mobilized by
activist groups working in response to the policy.
At an individual level, voters could view Secure Communities’ implementation as a threat
for a variety of reasons, and respond by turning out to vote. Social psychological theories of
protest suggest that the permeability of identity group boundaries is an important determi-
nant of protest behavior (Klandermans 1997). If Latino citizens feel they are being “lumped
in" with undocumented Latinos by the Secure Communities program, they could become
more likely to identify with potential deportees. They might become more likely to turn out
to vote in hopes of changing policy. Indeed, there is some evidence that Latino citizens fear
being painted with a broad brush by immigration policy. In the wake of Arizona’s passage
of the immigrant-targeting law SB1070, a survey of Latino registered voters in Arizona by
the firm Latino Decisions found that 85% of respondents expected that police would use
their power under the law to stop or question legal immigrants or U.S. citizens as well as
undocumented immigrants.6 Under Secure Communities, people in some areas have been
deported after arrests for relatively minor traffic violations, leading activists to claim that
they were being pulled over for “driving while Latino" (Ordonez 2011). If Latino citizens
feel that the government is singling out Latinos for punitive treatment, that facet of their
identity may become more salient, making them more responsive to mobilization efforts by
Latino political groups (or simply more likely to vote, as noted by Stokes (2003)). 7
6SB1070’s requirement that police determine the immigration status of anyone arrested or detained is
broader than the Secure Communities program, but Latino voters could feel targeted nonetheless.
7This could shape their vote choice as well as their turnout, which is beyond the scope of this paper. See
Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006) for consideration of partisanship in the face of anti-Latino policies.
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A related consideration is whether Latino voters feel “devalued" by the implementation
of Secure Communities. Pérez (2015a) draws on social identity theory to predict that elite
rhetoric that devalues a racial or ethnic minority group can drive high-identifying members
of that group to take political action and push back against the threat to their group. Like
the proposed mechanisms of Barreto and Woods (2005) and Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura
(2006), Pérez (2015a) predicts that elite rhetoric will threaten and mobilize certain potential
voters.8 In this research design focused on short-term effects, there is relatively little elite
rhetoric: most national- and state-level politicians were quiet about Secure Communities
until after the 2010 election, and a national debate about the program flared up only in 2011
when some states tried to opt out of the program. Most people talking about the program
in 2010 were either federal employees tasked with implementing it, or local immigration
activists seeking to prevent its implementation. However, I posit that even in the absence
of elite rhetoric, such a program could politicize Latino identity. The program itself may
be seen as discriminatory against Latinos, with voters fearing that the police will target
Latinos to arrest, fingerprint, and potentially deport. As such, knowledge of the Secure
Communities program could be enough to increase the salience of Latino identity (Armenta
and Hunt 2009) and potentially increase participatory behavior (Cronin et al. 2012).
All of the individual-level mechanisms just described require that potential voters are
aware of SC implementation, either from directly observing deportation processes or hearing
about the policy. Another set of possible mechanisms centers on the mobilization done by
activists in the wake of the policy’s implementation.
The communities in my sample contained a lot of immigration-related organizing po-
tential, both at the grassroots and national levels. Locally, Zepeda-Millan (2014) gives one
example of immigrant organizers opposing threatening legislation, describing how members
of a soccer club in Fort Myers, Florida became immigration activists during the spring of
2006. Meanwhile, a number of national and regional organizations have begun to focus
on political mobilization around immigration issues in recent years (Cordero-Guzman et al.
8Also see Pérez (2015b) for a discussion of how elite rhetoric shapes political trust among Latinos.
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2008). Groups such as the Hispanic Federation and United We Dream have worked with
local activists in a number of states (including Florida and Virginia) to encourage a variety
of activities, including voter drives.9 In the “treated" states in my sample, groups with an
interest in immigration issues, like Virginia New Majority and Democracia Ahora, worked
during the 2010 election to mobilize Latino voters.
It is possible that local or state-level activist groups focused on immigrant rights became
more active in voter mobilization after SC’s implementation in their area, either because
they thought that voting was more important, because they had more active members, or
because some national group reached out to them in the wake of the policy’s implementa-
tion. This mechanism does not necessarily depend on individual voters’ knowledge of the
Secure Communities policy: the turnout effects of voter mobilization efforts such as personal
contact have been demonstrated, particularly in the case of Latinos reaching out to mobilize
their coethnics (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Ramirez 2007; Barreto and Nuno 2009;
Bedolla and Michelson 2012). Latino voters could have turned out more in the wake of
SC implementation simply because they were more likely to be asked to do so. Section 1.5
explores the role of activist mobilization.
1.3 Data and Methodological Approach
Methodological approach
The Secure Communities program was first implemented voluntarily in several pilot cities
beginning in 2008, and then in other jurisdictions mainly along the southwestern border of
the US. Then, ICE sought to gradually expand the program across the country, still focusing
on jurisdictions that were willing to voluntarily sign up for the program. This is clearly a
source of selection bias: if I simply examined differences in turnout between places with and
without the Secure Communities program, my estimates of the causal effect of the program
9These efforts join the GOTV activities of groups focused solely on Latino civic engagement, such as Mi
Familia Vota.
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could be biased because places that volunteered to take part in the program might differ in
unobservable ways from other places.10
However, some jurisdictions received the program without selecting into it. Besides local
law enforcement agencies, ICE also negotiated with state law enforcement agencies to try to
implement the program across large swaths of the country. Some state-level agencies signed
memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the ICE. Depending on the structure of the state’s
law enforcement bodies and databases, some of these MOAs brought all jurisdictions within
the state into the program at the same time, without any affirmative action on the part
of those jurisdictions. This meant that anyone booked into the county jail in the affected
places would have their fingerprints checked against the ICE’s database, without the county
government having taken any action to make this happen.
These MOAs mean that some jurisdictions were treated (had the Secure Communities
program implemented within their borders) by the time of the 2010 general election without
having selected into treatment.11 Other jurisdictions in states without such MOAs, who
also took no action to enroll in Secure Communities, were left unenrolled. Comparing the
“reluctant enrollees" to non-enrolled jurisdictions allows me to find an unbiased estimate of
the causal effect of the SC program on Latino turnout for this subset of jurisdictions. I omit
from this analysis any jurisdictions that seem to have voluntarily enrolled in the program
without state intervention. The remaining number of treated and untreated units appears
in Table 1.3.12
10As an example: some places might select into the program as a response to growing Latino turnout
rates or the expectation of future turnout increases, perhaps because existing political elites felt threatened
by growing Latino political power. If this were the case, a simple comparison of turnout rates in treated
and untreated places could show a positive “treatment" effect on turnout even if the Secure Communities
program did nothing.
11I focus here on the 2010 general election because it was the only federal election for which this research
design is possible. At the time of the 2008 presidential election, only a handful of jurisdictions had been
enrolled in the program as a pilot. By the 2012 presidential election, nearly the entire country was enrolled.
Only in 2010 was there useful variation in enrollment.
12I also omit about 120 jurisdictions nationwide for which there is not reliable turnout data, due to a
combination of incomplete population estimates and missing or unreliable vote data from Catalist. About
80 of these jurisdictions are dropped due to implausible Latino turnout estimates when the two data sources
are combined (i.e., over 100%); the results presented are robust to simply including these places and their
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Figure 1.1: Jurisdictions considered treated (black), untreated (gray), and omitted (white)
for the main analysis.
I operationalize the treatment of “reluctant enrollment" as follows: for units in the states
that opted for universal enrollment (Delaware, Florida, Virginia, Texas, West Virginia), I
count units as reluctantly treated if they are in the very last block of jurisdictions to be
enrolled in the Secure Communities program. For example, of Florida’s 67 counties, 43
of them were enrolled in the Secure Communities program on June 22, 2010, shortly after
the state signed an agreement with ICE. The other Florida counties had already enrolled
in the program beginning in 2009, and so are excluded from this analysis due to concerns
that they selected into the program and might systematically differ from non-enrollees. In
states that did not enroll all jurisdictions in the program (“non-treated" states), I also omit
all jurisdictions that voluntarily enrolled in the program by the time of the 2010 general
election. Figure 1.3 shows treated, untreated, and omitted jurisdictions.
I run a simple difference-in-differences analysis, which compares the 2006-2010 change in
estimated turnout. This is a very small proportion of all units in the analysis, and represents places with
extremely small Latino populations.
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voter turnout in reluctantly-enrolled jurisdictions to the change in non-enrolled jurisdictions.
This requires a parallel trends assumption: if the treated units had not been treated, their
Latino voter turnout rates would have followed the same trend as the untreated units actually
showed. Thus any difference in the time trends of the two groups is taken to be the treatment
effect. However, the identification assumption does not require perfect equivalence between
groups: this does not assert that treated and untreated units looked exactly the same before
treatment, or that they would have had the same levels of Latino turnout absent treatment,
but simply that their trends over time would be the same. I use available data to test this
assumption in an appendix.
This approach allows for a clear causal estimate of the effect of SC enrollment on Latino
turnout, but it also restricts the set of places for which the estimate is valid: I am estimating
a Local Average Treatment Effect for the places in my sample. However, these places are
not a small or unimportant part of the overall picture: my sample contains treated units
from states with large Latino populations and ongoing immigration debates, such as Texas
and Florida. Table 2 compares the units in my restricted sample to the entire country. The
places included are indeed smaller and less dense on average, but they still contain notable
Latino populations.
Finally, it is worth noting that all of the “reluctant enrollees" in the sample were enrolled
in the program during the summer and fall of 2010. Only a few months elapsed between
their enrollment in SC and the 2010 election. As discussed in the literature review, there
are reasons to expect that the program could have other impacts over the longer term,
as residents observe actual deportations. However, this approach allows me to isolate the
short-term political impacts of enrollment, capturing the immediate response of activists
and voters in the few months after the program was announced.
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Data Sources
Information on the timing of Secure Communities implementation in over 3,000 jurisdic-
tions is drawn from ICE records.13 I have also gathered information on the date that state
officials signed MOAs (memoranda of agreement) with ICE officials.
Estimated Latino vote counts for general elections from 2006-2010 are drawn from the
Catalist database. Catalist, LLC is a data vendor that collects voter records from each
state and maintains a database of nearly 200 million registration records. They merge
state voter files with other publicly-available information and commercial information (from
advertising databases) to create individual-level records of people’s vote histories and other
characteristics. They then use name matching, age, consumer information, and census
block demographic data to impute each voter’s racial/ethnic background in states that do
not record race in the voter file (Fraga n.d.). Their database has reliable vote history data
from 2004 onward.
These are vote counts, but in order to calculate voter turnout rates, I need a denominator
as well: for this, I use CVAP (citizen voting-age population) estimates of Latino eligible
voters from the American Community Survey. Using CVAP estimates for each election year
allows me to calculate Latino voter turnout as a percentage of the total number of eligible
Latino voters in an area, not just the percent of registered voters that turn out.14 This
is important because the effect could operate through previously-unregistered people being
mobilized to register and vote.
1.4 Results
I first present observational results from the entire country, without dropping jurisdic-
tions that may have selected into Secure Communities. Table 1.3 shows the results of an OLS
13For the purpose of Secure Communities implementation, “jurisdictions" are generally counties, but in
some states they may also include county-equivalents, such as the independent cities of Virginia.
14Using ACS data provides intercensal estimates, so population estimates can change across the two
election years.
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regression of 2006-2010 change in Latino turnout onto enrollment in Secure Communities
(by the time of the 2010 election) and a set of election dummies. These dummies indicate
whether there was a senatorial or gubernatorial race on the ballot in the jurisdiction during
either of these election years, as these high-profile elections are expected to boost turnout
in midterm elections (Smith 2001). This first-cut analysis suggests that enrollment in the
Secure Communities program as of the 2010 election led to a greater increase in turnout
from 2006-2010 than would otherwise have been expected. Even in this basic model, Secure
Communities appears to increase voter turnout by about 1.1 percentage points.
Next, I restrict the dataset as discussed above, dropping jurisdictions that selected into
the Secure Communities program. The main analysis is conducted on this smaller dataset,
estimating a local average treatment effect of the program for these jurisdictions.
The Secure Communities program’s implementation resembles a cluster-randomized nat-
ural experiment. The treatment is assigned at the state level, not at the individual counties.
So treating each county as an independent unit in the analysis would seriously understate
the standard errors of the estimates and make the results look more significant than they
truly are (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). I analyze the data in a more conser-
vative way: I cluster standard errors at the state level, and also run a hierarchical model
that allows the intercepts and SC treatment effects to vary by state. Both approaches yield
substantively similar and statistically significant results.
Table 1.4 presents both approaches. The first two columns show estimates from a simple
OLS model with robust clustered standard errors. Column 1 displays the simplest specifica-
tion, regressing the 2006-2010 change in turnout rates onto the treatment variable. Column
2 includes dummy variables for the electoral calendar: whether there was a senatorial or gu-
bernatorial election occurring in each cluster in a given year. Voter turnout varies depending
on what races are at the top of the ballot, and states have different schedules for senatorial
and gubernatorial elections, so leaving these out makes the parallel-trends assumption about
turnout over time somewhat less tenable.
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Another approach is to allow the intercept and slope estimates to vary by state.15
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4 present the fixed effects from hierarchical linear models with
varying intercepts and slopes, and just varying intercepts, respectively.
Figure 1.4 plots the treatment coefficients from both approaches. In both cases, I esti-
mate that the implementation of the Secure Communities program increased Latino turnout
in the treated counties by 2-3 percentage points. This is a sizeable effect. Turnout has a
possible range of 0 (none of the eligible Latino voters turned out) to 100% (all eligible voters
turned out). The average 2006 Latino turnout rate for all counties in the dataset was 15%:
that is, 15% of Latino voting-age citizens turned out to vote.16 So a turnout increase of 2.4
percentage points in the treated counties (relative to the untreated ones) represents a large
jump in turnout. This increase in turnout is comparable to the treatment effect of receiving
three pieces of direct mail encouraging one to vote in the classic turnout experiment reported
in Gerber and Green (2000).
1.4.1 Stability of results
These results are consistent under various model specifications and data subsets.17 The
coefficient estimates from the model presented in column 4 of Table 1.4 remain quite similar
when I drop jurisdictions with very small numbers of Latino residents (all those below
207 eligible voters, the median in the dataset), and are statistically significant at p < 0:05.
Lower-population jurisdictions may have less reliable population and vote estimates, making
the main estimates noisier.
I also restrict the dataset to a smaller set of states where the treatment counterfactual
15One other approach that might otherwise be desirable, adding in state fixed effects, is not possible in
this study because there is no within-state variation in treatment in the dataset.
16This may seem quite low. Note that this is based on all eligible voters, not just those who have registered.
It is also a midterm election, and Latino turnout has been observed to be quite low during midterm elections
(Cassel 2002). Validated vote studies that are not prone to the over-reporting problems of survey self-reports
find low Latino turnout in both presidential and midterm elections. (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Cassel
2002)
17Regression tables available upon request.
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Figure 1.2: Estimates of SC treatment effect. “Covariates" indicates the inclusion of indica-
tor variables for whether the cluster had senatorial or gubernatorial races on the ballot in
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is more conservative. Perhaps some of the untreated places in the dataset could never have
been treated due to some unobservable differences in state-level politics, and so they might
make a bad comparison group to the treated units. So I restrict to a.) units within states
that had at least one jurisdiction enrolled in Secure Communities prior to the 2010 election,
and b.) units in states that actually signed a memorandum of agreement with ICE prior
to the 2010 election.18 In both cases, the logic is that these states didn’t have any clear
opposition to the program itself; they were prepared to allow jurisdictions to be enrolled,
but some of them didn’t happen to enroll all their jurisdictions at once by the time of the
2010 election. In these limited datasets, the treatment coefficient in the main hierarchical
linear model with election covariates remains substantially the same.
The results are also robust to using a more conservative analytic approach on the main
dataset, following Green and Vavreck (2007) in aggregating the data to the level at which
treatment was assigned. This yields a dataset with 49 state clusters rather than thousands
of individual jurisdictions.19 Regressing the cluster-level change in Latino turnout from 2006
to 2010 onto the SC treatment variable and the set of election-timing covariates, as in the
main analysis (weighted by the number of jurisdictions in each cluster, as in Green and
Vavreck (2007)), yields a treatment effect estimate of 2.9 percentage points (p=.034).
Next, I ensure that my results are not being driven by one state with poor data or uncom-
mon events. If one of the treated places had a particularly contested 2010 election, or if some
of the untreated places had uncharacteristically high Latino turnout in 2006, there could be
a difference in 2006-2010 slopes that was not actually due to my treatment. For example, it
is possible that Robert Menendez’s 2006 Senate campaign in New Jersey mobilized Latino
voters there to turn out to vote at higher-than-average levels, such that 2010’s return to ordi-
nary turnout levels looks like a drop in turnout. In cases like this, my difference-in-difference
18States besides my 5 “treated" states signed MOAs; however, not all units in these other states became
enrolled in the program by the 2010 election. This seems to have been due to differences in agreement
timing, the structure of state criminal justice information systems, and possibly ICE field office resources.
19Arizona does not appear in this dataset because all of its counties were enrolled individually in the SC
program before the 2010 election. This does not seem to have occurred as a result of any state action, as in
the “treated" states, but simply as a gradual voluntary enrollment.
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analyses could find an apparent “treatment effect" even if Latino turnout in treated places
were exactly the same before and after Secure Communities implementation.
To address such concerns, Figure 1.3 shows the estimated treatment effect (from the
preferred specification) when each state cluster is omitted from the analysis. The resulting
changes in effect size are minor, suggesting that no one state’s political landscape is driving
the results.
Finally, I run a placebo test to make sure that the effect estimated isn’t capturing
something else about the 2010 election season. Running the same analysis on a dataset of
non-Latino white turnout in the 2006 and 2010 elections does not yield a significant Secure
Communities treatment effect. White voters are less likely to feel threatened by the Secure
Communities program, are less likely to know deportable immigrants, and are less likely to
be targeted by activists seeking to get out the vote in the wake of program implementation.
That they do not respond to the Secure Communities “treatment" is reassuring, as it suggests
that the Latino effect measured here is in fact threat-related and not spurious. Similarly,
Appendix A reports results from another placebo test, checking for a treatment effect on
Latino turnout prior to the implementation of Secure Communities.
1.5 Possible Mechanisms
Secure Communities’ implementation could cause the voter turnout effects shown in
Figure 2 in several ways. First, voters could have direct personal experiences with immi-
gration enforcement, seeing family members or neighbors face deportation. As noted in
the introduction, the design of this paper explicitly precludes that possibility by focusing
on the immediate effects of the program in places that implemented it only a few weeks
or months before the election. In Appendix B, I provide further evidence that even with
fairly generous assumptions about the number of deportations that could have happened in
this short period, the number of people directly affected by SC does not seem to predict
voter turnout. Comparing places that had high numbers of fingerprint submissions to ICE
23
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Figure 1.3: Treatment estimates when sequentially dropping each state cluster from the
analysis. Dotted line represents the estimated treatment effect from the full sample.
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(the first thing to change after program implementation, and the first step on the path to
deportation) to those with low numbers of submissions, I do not observe any difference in
treatment effects. If direct personal experiences were driving these effects, we would expect
the effects to be concentrated among high-submission places where more fingerprints were
submitted and therefore more people could face the threat of eventual deportation. That
they are not suggests that something other than direct personal experience with the program
is driving the observed treatment effect.
The “threat" mechanisms by which Secure Communities could shape turnout fall into two
categories: individual voters’ responses, and activist mobilization. These are not mutually-
exclusive: for example, individuals could be aware of the program and feel threatened by it,
but not link that to political action until prompted to do so by activists. In this story, both
threat and activist mobilization would be necessary for turnout. I cannot fully distinguish
between these individual and mobilization mechanisms, as there is no good measure of
individual voters’ knowledge of the Secure Communities program at the time of enrollment.
However, I can use survey data on mobilization to look for evidence of activists’ role in
increasing voter turnout in affected places. In this section, I find that Latino voters in
places with Secure Communities were more likely to report being asked to turn out to vote
than those in other places.
1.5.1 Survey Data on the “Mobilization” Mechanism
Despite national reports of low interest and projections of low Latino voter turnout in
the 2010 midterm elections, there were vigorous on-the-ground voter mobilization efforts in
some places, including some of the “treated" jurisdictions in my sample. In central Florida,
volunteers with Democracia called Latino voters and encouraged them to turn out.20. Mi
Familia Vota partnered with other national and local organizations to launch a multistate
20Source: Democracia Ahora’s 2010 election-day liveblog, accessed December 2014 through the Internet
Archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20101123133606/http://democracia-ahora.org/blog/election_day_
live_blog/
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get-out-the-vote effort that included Texas and Florida.21 However, there is little available
data on these mobilization efforts, so it is difficult to tell whether they were more likely to
take place (or to be successful) in treated areas. Could these efforts have led to the turnout
results shown in Figure 1.4? For more systematic evidence on voter mobilization, I turn to
survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES) from 2010.
The question is whether Latino eligible voters in treated jurisdictions were more likely to
report being asked to vote than eligible voters in non-treated places. This appears to be the
case. Table 1.5 shows the results of regressing answers to the question “During the November
election campaign, did a candidate, party organization, or other organization contact you to
get you to vote?" onto various predictors for Latino respondents in 2010.22 Results presented
are from OLS models, with standard errors clustered at the county level. Column 1 reports
the bivariate relationship between living in a place with SC implementation and reporting
contact, which is positive and significant. It remains fairly large and marginally significant
even when including other factors that should predict activist or campaign contact, like
party identification or being a registered voter. Table 1.6 presents equivalent results for
respondents’ self-reported voting behavior in the 2010 general election. In this case, the
coefficient estimates are not always statistically significant, but are always positive, again
suggesting that Latinos living in counties with Secure Communities in place were more likely
to turn out to vote in 2010.
Living in a place where Secure Communities was implemented before the 2010 election
was associated (observationally) with more voter mobilization efforts for Latinos in 2010.
I ran two placebo tests to make sure that this wasn’t simply due to underlying differences
in mobilization across treated and untreated places. I find no comparable effect for Latino
CCES respondents in 2006, which is reassuring: the Secure Communities treatment should
not have an effect on the 2006 election, as it hadn’t yet happened. I also find no comparable
21http://latindispatch.com/2010/10/14/hispanic-groups-aim-to-mobilize-voters-before-november/
22For this analysis, I omit responses from jurisdictions that may have selected into the SC program, so
my geographic coverage is comparable to the main analysis. That is, responses are included from “reluctant
enrollee" counties and unenrolled counties as of the 2010 election.
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effect (neither substantively nor statistically significant) for non-Latino CCES respondents in
2010. Both these results should give us confidence that the results presented in table 1.5 are
not simply a coincidence, but are due to specific mobilization of Latinos in the wake of Secure
Communities implementation.23 These results do not rule out the possible importance of
individuals’ “threat" responses (learning about Secure Communities and deciding to vote
either without any mobilization, or because of both the policy and the mobilization), but
they demonstrate that mobilization is at least one pathway through which the policy affected
turnout.
23See appendix for regression tables.
27
State Units State Units
Delaware* 3 Mississippi 77
Florida* 43 Missouri 113
Texas* 25 Montana 53
Virginia* 46 Nebraska 91
West Virginia* 54 Nevada 11
Alabama 67 New Hampshire 10
Alaska 28 New Jersey 21
Arkansas 72 New Mexico 28
California 20 New York 58
Colorado 64 North Carolina 41
Connecticut 7 North Dakota 53
Georgia 151 Ohio 82
Hawaii 1 Oklahoma 75
Idaho 42 Oregon 32
Illinois 80 Pennsylvania 64
Indiana 92 Rhode Island 4
Iowa 98 South Carolina 39
Kansas 105 South Dakota 60
Kentucky 119 Tennessee 91
Louisiana 59 Utah 18
Maine 16 Vermont 14
Maryland 20 Washington 39
Massachusetts 12 Wisconsin 72
Michigan 79 Wyoming 23
Minnesota 87
Table 1.1: Units in dataset, by state. Asterisks indicated treated states (that is, all units
in the dataset from this state are treated. Other units from the state are excluded as they
may have self-selected into the program prior to state enrollment. Similarly (see text), units
from “untreated" states that voluntarily enrolled in the Secure Communities program are
excluded from these counts.)
Table 1.2: Mean values of Census/ACS characteristics for restricted sample, entire country.
Sample All jurisdictions
Latino citizen population, 2006 2143 5721
Total population, 2010 62594 96085
Population density, 2010 148 211
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Table 1.3: Observational approach: Comparing all jurisdictions enrolled in SC to all unen-
rolled jurisdictions
Dependent variable:
Turnout change, 2006-2010
Enrolled in SC by election 2010 0.011
(0.003)
Senate election 2010  0.027
(0.003)
Senate election 2006 0.001
(0.003)
Governor election 2006 0.002
(0.013)
Governor election 2010  0.009
(0.014)
Constant 0.025
(0.005)
Observations 3,044
R2 0.034
Adjusted R2 0.033
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Turnout change, 2006-2010
OLS linear
mixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (Involuntary SC enrollment) 0.013 0.024 0.021 0.019
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
Senate election 2006  0.031  0.025  0.024
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Senate election 2010 0.004 0.009 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Governor election 2006  0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.026) (0.026)
Governor election 2006  0.010  0.014  0.013
(0.006) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 0.006 0.029 0.021 0.018
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Observations 2,478 2,478 2,478 2,478
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Table 1.4: Main analysis: Jurisdiction-level difference-in-differences. OLS models
include standard errors clustered at the state level, using the RMS package in R (command
robcov, specifying the Efron method.)
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Table 1.5: Reported campaign/activist contact, CCES 2010 (Latinos)
(1) (2) (3)
SC Treatment 0.158 0.130 0.129
(0.071) (0.074) (0.072)
Registered Voter 0.247 0.192
(0.019) (0.019)
Gender: Female 0.010 0.009
(0.001) (0.001)
Age  0.051  0.043
(0.024) (0.023)
Party ID:Republican 0.030
(0.032)
Party ID: Independent  0.080
(0.031)
Party ID: Other 0.215
(0.061)
Party ID: Not Sure  0.267
(0.029)
Senate Election 2010 0.063
(0.035)
Governor Election 2010  0.007
(0.040)
Constant 0.454  0.138  0.052
(0.018) (0.027) (0.051)
Observations 1,460 1,460 1,460
R2 0.004 0.194 0.242
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.192 0.237
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Reported general election turnout, CCES 2010 (Latinos)
(1) (2) (3)
SC Treatment 0.141 0.116 0.059
(0.070) (0.073) (0.066)
Registered Voter 0.093 0.063
(0.045) (0.041)
Gender: Female 0.011 0.010
(0.001) (0.001)
Age  0.115  0.097
(0.023) (0.022)
Party ID:Republican 0.043
(0.035)
Party ID: Independent 0.015
(0.040)
Party ID: Other 0.052
(0.085)
Party ID: Not Sure  0.404
(0.039)
Senate Election 2010 0.105
(0.048)
Governor Election 2010  0.016
(0.052)
Constant 0.586 0.069 0.130
(0.017) (0.054) (0.077)
Observations 1,334 1,334 1,334
R2 0.004 0.144 0.227
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.142 0.221
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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1.6 Discussion/Conclusion
This paper finds evidence that Latino voters in places where Secure Communities was
implemented turned out more than they would otherwise have been expected to do. This
turnout seems to have been accompanied by more contacts asking Latinos to vote. This
suggests mobilization in response to threat of a specific kind: people being mobilized by (or
in the wake of) policies that by definition did not target them personally. These findings
open many avenues for future work.
First, time may yield better data with which to test this process, as more years of data
are available to test parallel trends and other immigration enforcement policies emerge.
Next, the specific process of mobilization merits close examination. Who asked Latino
citizens to turn out in the wake of policy changes? How do places differ in their capacity
for this sort of mobilization? What is the role of elite actors in organizing the response to
such policies? Finally, when does this result (of increased turnout) hold, and when does
it disappear or even reverse? Other punitive or paternalistic policies are associated with
diminished turnout, even for those who experience them secondhand (Burch 2013; Weaver
and Lerman 2014; Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010). Why should the realm of immigration
enforcement differ?
The case of immigration enforcement is different from policies like welfare policy or incar-
ceration in several ways. The intervention studied here, the Secure Communities program,
was a distinct policy change that affected entire counties at once; work on policy feedbacks of
welfare or prison has usually focused on the contact that a specific person or family has with
the government, not with major changes in broad policy. Further, deportation policies might
be thought to target a less stigmatized population than welfare or incarceration, though this
is debatable. Deportation also differs from most policies in that it cannot be expected to
happen to voters, no matter what: voters have no reason to fear retaliatory deportation (at
least of themselves) if they become politically involved. Finally, the potential voters studied
in this paper, Latino citizens across the US, span a wide range of ages, classes, education
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and income levels. Which of these differences matter most for mobilization have yet to be
determined.
These results on immigration policy also have implications for party competition. In
the case of Secure Communities, a Democratic president implemented a program that was
unpopular with Latino voters, but that actually prompted these voters to turn out at higher
rates–and quite possibly to vote for Democrats. This pattern is both counterintuitive and
different from the rest of the policy feedback literature. Time will tell whether this pat-
tern of Democratic politicians benefiting from Democrats’ restrictive immigration policies)
will persist, with Latino voters becoming increasingly “captured" by the Democratic party
(Frymer 1999), or whether the Republican party will be able to successfully compete for
Latino votes.
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2 | Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement?
The demobilizing effects of brief jail spells on
potential voters
2.1 Introduction
The last few decades have brought historic levels of incarceration in the US. Rising prison
and jail populations have been disproportionately drawn from poor and minority neighbor-
hoods, with some cities seeing the emergence of “million dollar blocks" where incarceration is
so concentrated that over a million dollars a year is being spent to incarcerate the residents
of a single city block. Black men, especially those without high school diplomas or college
education, now face incredibly high risks of conviction and incarceration. Of Black men
born between 1965 and 1969, for example, nearly 60 percent of those without high school
diplomas had spent time in prison by age 30 (Pettit and Western 2004)
Rising incarceration has wrought major changes in the lives of people who come into con-
tact with the criminal justice system. Young men change the rhythms of their lives to avoid
police encounters or apprehension on warrants; families jump through hoops to visit loved
ones in prison; released felons find that they cannot get honest work (Comfort 2008; Goff-
man 2009; Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009). Political behavior may also be affected.
Recent work finds that interactions with the criminal justice system, and incarceration in
particular, cause people to retreat from political participation (Fairdosi 2009; Weaver and
Lerman 2010, 2014). Given the demographics of arrestees, such a retreat could mean that
young men of color would be even more underrepresented in the electorate.
This paper brings a causal approach to the question of whether incarceration decreases
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voter turnout. Relying on random courtroom assignment in a major county court system,
I use courtroom variability in sentencing as a source of exogenous variation in jail time.
Defendants are randomly assigned to courtrooms, and some courtrooms are more prone
to sentencing defendants to jail than others. First-time misdemeanor defendants in Harris
County who are sentenced to jail time due to an “unlucky draw" in courtroom assignment
are slightly less likely to vote in the next election than their luckier but otherwise comparable
peers.
I estimate that jail sentences reduce voting in the subsequent election by about 4 percent-
age points. However, this overall estimate conceals starkly different effects by race. White
defendants show small, non-significant positive treatment effects of jail on voting, while
Latino defendants show a decrease in turnout due to jail, and Black defendants’ turnout in
the next election drops by an astonishing 13 percentage points. I hypothesize that this is at
least partly due to different approaches to arrest and prosecution: black citizens are much
more likely to face scrutiny and arrest, and so black voters are more likely to be caught up
in the legal system (while white arrestees were less likely to vote even before arrest). Vote
history data provides some support for this theory: black defendants are much more likely
to have voted in the presidential election before their arrest.
This paper’s findings are bolstered by the data sources used and the causal identification
provided by random case assignment. Unlike past survey research on this question, this
project relies on administrative records for information about both jail sentences and voting,
and so is not subject to misreporting or memory lapses. The instrumental variables approach
used here produces causal estimates of the effect of jail on voting for an interesting and
important subset of the population, misdemeanor defendants who could hypothetically have
received some jail time or none depending on the courtroom to which they were assigned.
Focusing on misdemeanor defendants for this analysis has several benefits. The results of
this study can be generalized to an exceedingly large pool of people: millions of misdemeanor
cases are filed in the US each year, with hundreds of thousands of people receiving short jail
sentences. And the results presented here underscore how important even “minor" criminal
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justice interactions can be (Roberts 2011). Finally, the focus on misdemeanors allows for a
test of voter deterrence without legal restrictions on voting, as none of the defendants in my
analysis will be legally disfranchised due to felony convictions.
This paper presents new evidence that incarceration, even for short periods, can drasti-
cally reduce future political participation. These results raise normative concerns, especially
given the racial makeup of the incarcerated population. Racial differences in treatment ef-
fects will further amplify the representational impact of jail on voting: black citizens were
already more likely to have criminal justice contact, but my results suggest jail will also
have more of demobilizing effect on black defendants. The nation’s jails are not only sites
of policy implementation, but have important effects on future elections and the inclusivity
of American democracy.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Incarceration as a Demobilizing Force
The first goal of this paper is to test whether incarceration reduces voter turnout. A
number of existing studies have proposed mechanisms by which incarceration could deter
voters, and in this paper I test whether jail sentences have a negative causal effect on voting.
I depart from previous work on the topic by focusing on misdemeanor cases, which are both
common and non-legally-disenfranchising.
There are many reasons to expect that incarceration would deter people from voting.
Weaver and Lerman (2010, 2014) describe a mechanism by which people learn to fear and
avoid government through criminal justice interactions, and so do not vote. This is similar to
work on other negative interactions with government, such as applying for welfare (Soss 1999;
Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010), and builds on findings that incarceration is associated with
lower levels of political efficacy (Fairdosi 2009). Just as earlier work on policy feedbacks
highlighted how government programs could empower and engage people, making them
more politically-active, recent work describes how disempowering or punitive government
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interactions can deter participation.
An even simpler mechanism by which incarceration could prevent voting is through the
many costs that incarceration imposes. Even short spells in jail can lead to job loss or
major loss of income, loss of housing, and family disruption (Western 2006). Any of these
experiences could also prevent people from voting (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
But one of the central challenges of prior research on the topic is that it is difficult to
disentangle the effects of incarceration from confounders such as criminal behavior. Many
authors have questioned whether people who engage in criminal behavior and are then
incarcerated were likely to vote even if they hadn’t been jailed, imprisoned, or barred from
voting via felon disenfranchisment laws (Haselswerdt 2009; Miles 2004; Hjalmarsson and
Lopez 2010; Gerber et al. 2015). Existing research has attempted to address this question
using survey self-reports1 and various matching or time-series approaches, but it has proved
difficult to demonstrate that incarceration itself causes lower turnout.
Further, many of the mechanisms by which incarceration is thought to reduce voting
involve voluntary actions: people decide to stay home on election day due to their past ex-
periences with government. But in practice, looking at the voting behavior of the previously-
incarcerated generally conflates voluntary actions with legal fact: many people who are in-
carcerated have been convicted of felonies, and are thus ineligible to vote for at least some
period of time in most states. In many states, they will actually be purged from the voter
rolls, and so will face an additional hurdle if they do try to vote when released. In some
states, they will need to apply to be reinstated as voters; in a few, they will most likely
remain ineligible for life (The Sentencing Project 2013).
Focusing on misdemeanor defendants allows me to measure voluntary withdrawal from
politics, rather than legal restrictions on voting such as felon disfranchisement laws.2 But
1Some recent work has used administrative records to measure contact with the criminal justice system
(Meredith and Morse 2013, 2014; Gerber et al. 2015).
2A related concern here is that some potential voters might mistakenly believe they are ineligible to vote
after a misdemeanor conviction. I do not think this can fully account for the effects found; this issue is
discussed further in the results section.
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misdemeanor cases are also interesting in their own right, and have been understudied.
They are extremely common: although exact national counts of misdemeanor cases are not
available, one source estimated that there were 10.5 million misdemeanor prosecutions in
2006 (Boruchowitz, Brink, and Dimino 2009). And although they carry fewer legal and social
consequences than felonies, there are still many collateral consequences to misdemeanor
convictions, as well as the possibility of jail time, probation, and fines (Roberts 2011).
From the existing literature on incarceration and voting, and this understanding of mis-
demeanor cases, I derive the first hypothesis of this study: jail sentences will render misde-
meanor defendants less likely to vote (all else being equal).
2.2.2 Racial Differences in Incarceration’s Effects
Existing work on incarceration and voting has focused on the average effect within the
population, but there are reasons to expect that effects could differ by race.
Criminal cases (especially misdemeanors) have been subject to concerns about racial
discrimination at nearly every stage of the process, from policing to arrest to charging to
sentencing. Black men, especially those without college education, are disproportionately
likely to be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated (Pettit and Western 2004). There is an
ongoing debate about how much of the racial difference in arrest and conviction is due to
underlying differences in criminal activity, and how much are driven by racial discrimination.
In lower-level crimes, discretionary behavior by police and prosecutors may become more
important, and racial bias could more easily come into play (Spohn 2000; McKenzie 2009).
In drug cases in some jurisdictions, for example, people of color make up a high proportion of
defendants despite not using drugs at higher rates than whites (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst
2006; Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap 2007). This is often attributed to greater scrutiny of
black neighborhoods by police and discretionary charging behavior by prosecutors.
A sizeable body of academic research, as well as many first-hand accounts in main-
stream media and literature, documents black Americans’ exposure to policing and arrest.
Qualitative studies have described heavy-handed police behavior in minority neighborhoods
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(Brunson and Miller 2006; Rios 2011), while quantitative studies have analyzed the targeting
of black citizens through traffic stops or programs like New York’s now-defunct “Stop-and-
Frisk" (Meehan and Ponder 2002; Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007; Antonovics and Knight
2009). As such, we might expect racial differences in defendants’ pre-existing characteristics,
as well as their post-release voting behavior.
This existing literature suggests several possible reasons for differing effects. If arrest
patterns differ by race, black defendants could differ from white defendants in their pre-arrest
voting habits; black voters could be more likely to be arrested and ultimately demobilized,
while white arrestees might not have been likely voters to begin with. Alternatively, black
misdemeanor defendants sentenced to jail could experience different treatment in jail than
white inmates. Or, black defendants sentenced to jail could interpret the sentence differently,
perceiving the court system’s treatment as more unfair than a white defendant in similar
circumstances. Any of these mechanisms could lead to larger effects for black than white
defendants.3
Because this paper uses administrative records rather than survey responses, I have
enough observations to look for racial differences in jail’s effect on voting. I test the hypoth-
esis that black defendants will show more demobilization than white defendants.
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Misdemeanor Case Data
I use a dataset from Harris County, Texas, of first-time misdemeanor defendants whose
cases were filed in the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law between November 5, 2008
3The prediction is less clear for other racial or ethnic groups. Latinos, for example, have certainly had
fraught interactions with police in some places (Rios 2011). But with lower residential segregation and a
somewhat different history of police encounters, Latinos may not consistently face the same kinds of police
targeting that could lead to larger effects for Black defendants. Results found in Harris County may not be
completely generalizable to other contexts.
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and November 6, 2012.4 This dataset was provided by the Harris County District Clerk’s
office. For each defendant, I have identifying information (name, birthdate, address, and
unique identification number), some demographic data (sex, race, age), a description of the
charges faced (the exact charge, as well as the charge severity), courtroom assignment, and
sentencing outcomes (disposition, any fines/probation/jail).5 This time window yields a
dataset of 113,423 defendants.
Harris County is the third largest county in the US, located in the southeast corner
of Texas. It contains the city of Houston, and is home to just over 4 million people. Its
misdemeanor court system is, accordingly, large, with 15 courtrooms hearing about 45,000
cases per year.
First-time misdemeanor cases filed with the Harris County District Clerk are randomly
assigned to one of fifteen courtrooms by a computer program.6 Each courtroom in the
misdemeanor court system consists of a single judge and a team of prosecutors at any
given time; judges face re-election every four years, while prosecutors are assigned to the
courtroom by the District Attorney’s office and can remain in the same courtroom for months
or years (Mueller-Smith 2014). Common case types for these courtrooms include driving
while intoxicated, theft, possession of small amounts of marijuana, and certain types of
(non-aggravated) assault.
Misdemeanor charges in Texas carry penalties of up to one year in jail, along with the
4I begin with cases filed immediately after the 2008 election and omit records for defendants whose cases
were filed on or after the date of the 2012 election for the main analysis; the post-election data is later used
for a placebo test.
5A few defendants likely have incorrect ages recorded, as evidenced by the extreme minimum and maxi-
mum values of the age variable (6 and 92 years old). These outliers represent a small fraction of the overall
caseload, and the results are robust to omitting all extreme ages (such as restricting to only ages 18-60).
6Defendants with prior convictions, such as those still on probation from a prior case with a given court,
can be sent back to their original courtroom. This is a primary reason for focusing on first-time defendants
(RULES OF COURT, Harris County Criminal Courts at Law 2013). Based on a conversation with the
Harris County District Clerk’s office, I identified first-time defendants using historical county records: any
defendants whose unique court ID number appeared in a case filed between 1980 and 2008 were omitted
from the dataset. Records were not available for cases filed before 1980, so it is possible that a very few
defendants included in this dataset were actually repeat arrestees. However, given the age distribution of
the defendants in my dataset, this should be quite rare.
41
possibility of fines or probation. These cases are generally handled with a minimum of
courtroom time, as county courts handle scores of misdemeanor cases per courtroom per
day. Jury trials are exceedingly rare, and most defendants plead guilty (often on the advice
of their time-strapped court-appointed attorney).
The Harris County defendants dataset includes information on the verdicts and sentences
in each case. For this analysis, I focus on the first case or cases faced by a defendant.
For defendants with multiple charges filed the same day, I collapse those observations to
calculate whether they received a particular sentencing outcome in any of their cases. Cases
filed at the same time for the same individual would be heard by the same courtroom.7 For
cases with deferred adjudication, I ignore anything that happens after the first sentencing
decision. If someone is sentenced to probation, for example, and later ends up being sent to
jail because they violated that probation agreement, I do not count this as a jail sentence,
only as a probation sentence. I also drop eight cases with clearly impossible sentence lengths
(over 100 years), which I attribute to data entry errors.8
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on a range of possible sentencing outcomes. These
outcomes are not mutually exclusive: one can receive a jail sentence and be assessed a fine for
the same charge. About half of people who face misdemeanor charges in Harris County are
ultimately sentenced to some jail time. Even including several implausibly long sentences,
the mean sentence is under one month. Conditional on receiving some jail time, the median
sentence is 10 days.
2.3.2 Merging Court Records to Voting Records
In order to examine incarceration’s impact on voting, I needed to measure voter turnout
among all first-time defendants. In the main analysis presented here, voter turnout data
7Results are also robust to dropping defendants with more than one misdemeanor case.
8Some other sentences in the dataset appear implausibly long (> 1 year) but could be the result of
multiple misdemeanor charges being sentenced at once; results presented below are robust to including or
omitting these observations.
42
Table 2.1: Criminal Sentencing, 2009-2012
Statistic Mean St. Dev.
Conviction 0.697 0.459
Fine 0.297 0.457
Probation 0.240 0.427
Jail 0.532 0.499
Total Sentence Length (Days) 23.966 57.998
Sentence > 1year 0.008 0.091
Sentence > 1month 0.198 0.399
comes from the Texas voter file.9
Defendants’ court records were linked to the voter file on defendant/voter names and
birthdates. I first merged the files on the last name, first initial, and birthdate columns.
Then, “ties" between potential matches were adjudicated using string distances between the
first names reported in both files. I calculated how dissimilar the first names were in all
possible matches, and then dropped potential matches that fell below a certain distance
threshold. Of remaining potential matches, I retained the one where the first names were
most similar.10
The voter registration and turnout rates in the resulting dataset are relatively low, as
one would expect for a sample of people who recently faced criminal charges. Roughly a
third of first-time defendants with cases between 2009 and 2012 showed up as registered
voters after the 2012 election, and about 13 percent of them were marked as having voted
in the 2012 general election.11
9The voter file was generously provided by NationBuilder, which collects voter files as part of their
campaign services business. The file was provided in late 2014, but had been collected from the state prior
to the 2014 election (so it contained turnout history for 2012 and earlier elections for voters registered as
of 2014). The Supplementary Information (SI) presents a comparison between vote turnout totals derived
from this file and the Secretary of State’s official reported turnout; the 2012 voter file turnout totals are less
than 3% off of the SOS counts.
10For this approach, I used R’s stringdist package, with the “jaro-winkler" option. I used .2 as an ab-
solute cutoff for match quality, but show plots in the SI demonstrating that changing this cutoff does not
substantively change the results.
11If a defendant was not matched to the voter file, I consider them as a nonvoter in 2012. I calculate
turnout, not turnout conditional on registration, for two reasons. First, the difficulty of registering when
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Because names and birthdates could be recorded differently in different datasets or could
be shared by multiple people, it is possible that this merge could either under- or over-report
the rate of voter registration among previous defendants. An unregistered defendant could
be matched to some other person’s voter record (false positives), or a registered defendant
could be left unmatched due to name or birthdate errors (false negatives). I follow Meredith
and Morse (2014) in conducting a permutation test to check for false positives: I add 35
days to each defendant’s actual birthdate and attempt to merge this permuted dataset to the
voter file. Finding many matches for this permuted data would suggest that false matches
are common, and would cast doubt on the actual matching process.
When I permute the birthdates of the actual dataset and attempt to match it to the
voter file, fewer than 100 (of over 100,000 defendants) match: a match rate of less than one
percent. These results suggest that my actual match rate of roughly 1 in 3 of the defendants
matching to voter records is unlikely to be driven by incorrect matches.
Assessing the rate of false negatives (missed matches) is more difficult. The fuzzy string
matching of first names allows for some small typographical errors across files. However,
errors in birthdate or last name, or extreme variation in first names, could certainly result
in missed matches. If there were such missed matches, they would likely bias my estimates
toward zero, making the results presented in this paper a conservative estimate of the effects
of jail on voting.12
one’s life has been upset by a jail sentence is one possible mechanism by which jail could reduce voting. Also,
I cannot be sure that people who were registered as of 2014 had been registered prior to the 2012 election.
12In the SI, I explore this point further by discarding some of the matches from my main dataset and
seeing what the addition of these “missed matches" does to the analysis. The estimates shrink towards zero
and become more uncertain as I discard more and more actual matches.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Preliminary Approach
Before using the instrumental variables (IV) approach of the main analysis, I report the
simplest specification: ordinary least squares regression of 2012 voter turnout on having been
sentenced to jail for a first-time misdemeanor charge in the four years prior. The results
of this analysis appear in Table 2.2. These estimates are likely biased: defendants who go
to jail are probably different from those who don’t in a number of unobserved ways. But
they provide a descriptive understanding of the data, and a baseline for comparison with
the IV estimates. And these estimates invite further investigation: the negative coefficient
on jail in the first column suggests that jail is associated with lower voter turnout in the
next election, while the interaction term between Black identity and jail in the third column
suggests that that negative relationship is more pronounced for Black defendants.
2.4.2 Main IV Results
Hypothetically, we could measure the effect of incarceration on voting by randomly
assigning some people to go to jail and others not, and then observing the different turnout
behavior between those two groups. This real-world experiment would not be ethical for
social scientists to run. But the random assignment of cases to courtrooms has some things in
common with that experiment. Cases are assigned at random to courtrooms that are more or
less likely to jail defendants that come before them. Some defendants have committed crimes
that would always lead to some jail time, and some defendants would have been acquitted
(or convicted but not sentenced to any jail time) no matter what courtroom assignment
they received. But for some subset of those defendants (compliers, in the language of
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)), we can imagine a coin flip: if they are assigned to a
“harsher" courtroom, they will receive some jail time, but in a “more lenient" courtroom they
would not. The instrumental variables design allows me to capture this random variation
in sentencing to measure the effect of jail time on voting for these defendants.
45
Table 2.2: OLS estimates
Dependent variable:
vote2012
(1) (2) (3)
Jail  0:105  0:097  0:080
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Voter Birth Year  0:005  0:005
(0:0001) (0:0001)
Black 0:115 0:146
(0:002) (0:003)
Male  0:043  0:043
(0:002) (0:002)
Jail*Black  0:060
(0:004)
Constant 0:183 9:464 9:403
(0:001) (0:175) (0:174)
Observations 113,415 113,285 113,285
R2 0.025 0.073 0.074
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.072 0.074
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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I use courtroom assignment to instrument for incarceration (Kling 2006; Green andWinik
2010; Mueller-Smith 2014). In order for this approach to identify the effect of incarceration
on voting, the exclusion restriction must hold. In this case, that means that assignment
to a particular courtroom cannot affect voting except through incarceration. In many ways,
this seems reasonable: judges are not in the habit of talking about voting during sentencing,
and most defendants will spend very little time in the courtroom for a misdemeanor case.
However, one possible concern is that other sentencing decisions besides incarceration (such
as probation or fines) could also affect voting, and that courtrooms that give out harsher
sentences are also harsher on one of these dimensions. I discuss this concern (sometimes
described as “omitted treatments") in section 2.4.4.
This IV approach also requires several other assumptions to be met. First, courtroom
assignment (the instrument) must be truly exogenous, not determined by some defendant or
case characteristics. And there must be sufficient courtroom-level sentencing variation: if all
courtrooms sentenced defendants in the same way, being randomly assigned to a particular
courtroom wouldn’t change one’s probability of a jail sentence.
Figure 2.1 and Table D.1 address these requirements. Figure 2.1 summarizes various
defendant and case characteristics by courtroom as a first step towards demonstrating that
caseloads are comparable across courtrooms as we would expect under random assignment.
The random assignment of cases to courtrooms should mean that all fifteen courtrooms have
similar caseloads, with similar numbers and types of cases as well as balanced defendant
characteristics.13 Figure 2.1 shows the range of case and defendant characteristics in all
15 courtrooms; courtrooms’ caseloads look quite similar on the pre-treatment covariates of
sex, race, and age, as well as on charge severity (Class A versus Class B misdemeanor).
Even the most extreme courtroom generally falls quite near the mean value of each of
these variables. However, despite receiving similar caseloads, courtrooms then display very
different sentencing behavior, as shown by the wide range of jail rates shown on the right-
13A very small fraction of cases do not appear in this dataset due to records being sealed, which could
hypothetically lead to some imbalance.
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hand side of each panel. Table E.1 in the Appendix presents each courtroom’s values of
these variables over this time period. In Appendix A, I also test more formally for patterns
that would suggest non-random assignment to courtrooms.
My main IV results instrument for jail (whether a defendant is sentenced to jail or not) us-
ing courtrooms’ incarceration propensity. The instrument is constructed as the courtroom’s
mean incarceration rate over any given year: how many of the people who came before that
courtroom ended up sentenced to jail?14 In practice, the incarceration instrument calculated
yearly ranges from .47 to .63, demonstrating that courtrooms display substantial variation
in their sentencing decisions.
I recalculate the instruments over time because of concerns that courtroom changes could
render a courtroom more or less prone to incarceration. The monotonicity assumption for
this IV setup requires that being assigned to a “harsher" courtroom (one with a higher
overall incarceration rate) makes one more likely to be sentenced to jail. If courtrooms’
incarceration propensities shift over time, the monotonicity assumption could be violated.
For example, Courtroom 3 incarcerated 52% of defendants with cases filed in 2011, while in
2012 it incarcerated only 49% of defendants. Courtroom 6 changed from a 51% incarceration
rate in 2011 to 56% in 2012. Looking over this entire period, Courtroom 6 looks like a harsher
courtroom. But in cases filed in 2011, defendants were actually slightly more likely to be
jailed if they were assigned to Courtroom 3. Recalculating the instruments over time allows
courtrooms to change.15
Results Table 2.3 presents 2-stage least squares (2SLS) results from this approach. The
first column presents the first-stage regression of jail sentences onto the courtroom-jail-rate
instrument, demonstrating that the instrument is relevant. The first-stage F-statistic is
large, suggesting that concerns about weak instruments are not merited (Stock, Wright,
14With few instruments in play, this approach is analogous to simply using courtroom indicator variables
as instruments, interacting them with filing-year indicators.
15These changes in courtroom behavior could be due to personnel changes (new judges or prosecutors
entering a courtroom) or to within-person behavioral shifts.
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Figure 2.1: Box plot of the full range of several pre-treatment variables, as well as jail
sentences, for the 15 county courtrooms. The box edges represent the 25th and 75th per-
centiles and the middle line the median value of the variable; the whiskers extend to the
most extreme value of that variable among the 15 courtrooms in that year. The different
courtrooms’ values of pre-treatment variables such as age and race appear tightly clustered
(reflecting the random assignment of cases to courtrooms), while the large spread on the
“jail" variable demonstrates sentencing variability among the courtrooms.
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and Yogo 2002). The second column presents the 2SLS estimates of jail’s effect on voting,
estimated for all defendants. The negative coefficient suggests that a jail sentence decreases
one’s probability of voting in the 2012 election by 4 percentage points, though it is im-
precisely estimated. This estimate provides some evidence for the first hypothesis, that
jail sentences reduce voter turnout in the subsequent election, but I cannot rule out the
possibility that jail has no effect on turnout.
Table 2.3: Jail Sentences on 2012 Voting
Dependent variable:
jail vote2012
(1) (2)
Court Jail Average (Yr) 0.999
(0.051)
Jail  0.044
(0.034)
Most Severe Charge 0.021 0.016
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant  0.121 0.053
(0.035) (0.020)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 113,403 113,403
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.017
F Statistic 89.009 (df = 6; 113396)
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Next, I split the sample to explore whether the deterrent effect of jail differs by race.16
Table F.1 presents 2SLS estimates of the effect of jail on voting for black and white
defendants separately, and Figure 2.2 plots them. The estimates are strikingly different. The
16Race, unlike the few other personal characteristics available from court records (age, gender, physical
characteristics and markings), is an obvious choice for subgroup analysis. Existing literature has established
African-Americans’ high levels of criminal justice contact and system mistrust, both of which could lead to
different treatment effects from jail sentencing.
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Figure 2.2: Jail’s effect on voter turnout (2SLS estimates), by race of defendant. A coefficient
of -.13 indicates a turnout decrease of 13 percentage points (among compliers).
treatment effect of jail on voting for black defendants is substantively large and statistically
significant, about 13 percentage points’ decrease in voter turnout. The estimate for white
defendants is small (one tenth of a percentage point) and statistically indistinguishable from
zero. The SI presents a slightly different model including both groups of defendants and
interacting race with jail to test whether these effects are significantly different from one
another, and they are statistically distinguishable (p < 0:01). Black defendants and white
defendants respond to jail sentences differently. One possible interpretation of these racial
differences is as evidence of overpolicing and black criminalization. I explore this possibility
further in section 2.4.3.
Harris County’s court database includes a “defendant race" variable that only indicates
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whether a defendant is Black, White, Asian, Native American, uncategorized, or “other".
This database classifies Hispanic defendants as white, so the above analysis discussing
“white" defendants includes both Hispanic and Anglo defendants. However, in Appendix E,
I discuss an approach using surname matching to identify Hispanic defendants. Hispanic
defendants (as identified by surname, undoubtedly with some errors) do seem to show a neg-
ative effect of jail on voting, but I cannot say for certain that there is a difference between
Hispanic and Anglo defendants.
Interpretation These estimates are not of the average treatment effect of jail on voting
for all defendants; instead, they represent a local average treatment effect (LATE) for “com-
pliers," defendants who could conceivably have received jail sentences or not depending on
their courtroom assignment.
This local effect is interesting from a policy standpoint. The defendants who are being
jailed and ultimately deterred from voting in this study are not repeat violent offenders
who clearly must be incarcerated for public safety. They are first-time misdemeanants who
may face some jail time, or may not, because a computer randomly assigned them to face
one judge or another. That judges’ exercise of sentencing discretion in these minor cases
has such large downstream effects on voting is both surprising and alarming. However, the
fact that this study’s estimates are drawn from a specific pool of compliers does not mean
that they cannot be generalized to a broader set of defendants. If compliers are similar to
other defendants on characteristics that shape voting propensity, and they experience jail
and the court system as equally arbitrary and degrading, the effects measured here should
be generalizable to many other defendants. 17 I discuss the generalizability of these results
further in Section 2.4.5.
These are causal effects of jail on voting, but they do not identify the precise mechanism
by which this demobilization occurs. I interpret these results as a measure of individuals
17One notable feature of this design is that defendants are unlikely to know whether or not they are
compliers. The criminal justice system is opaque, especially to first-time defendants, and few compliers will
even know about random courtroom assignment, much less think (any more than other defendants do) that
they would have fared better or worse in another courtroom.
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choosing to withdraw from political participation after being jailed. This could happen
because their time in jail taught them to avoid government and decreased their sense of
personal efficacy, as suggested by Bruch, Ferree, and Soss (2010), Weaver and Lerman
(2014) and others.
A related mechanism is resource-related: rather than convincing voters to avoid gov-
ernment, it could produce many practical barriers to voting. We know that incarceration
(even in short stints) can lead to job loss, family disruption, and housing and economic chal-
lenges. And although misdemeanor convictions carry fewer legal sanctions than felonies (for
example, they don’t bar people from voting), they still can carry collateral consequences like
restricted access to public benefits or occupational licenses.18 It is possible that individuals
still believe in the value of voting (contrary to the theory of Weaver and Lerman (2014)),
but that they simply find it too difficult to vote when they are dealing with other problems
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The two mechanisms (jail socialization and resource
constraints) are slightly different, and I cannot distinguish between them without further
data on either resources or defendants’ views of government. Nonetheless, either mechanism
would speak to the lasting impact of jail on people’s lives and political engagement, even in
the absence of legal restrictions on voting.
There are two other possible mechanisms that I find less likely. First, would-be voters
might still want to vote, but mistakenly think they were ineligible. For this to explain the
above results, they would need to know that an arrest did not make them ineligible, but
think that jail time served for a misdemeanor barred them from voting.19 Prior research has
shown that there is substantial misinformation among ex-felons about voting eligibility, and
that notifying them of their right to vote can boost turnout in some cases (Meredith and
Morse 2013). But Drucker and Barreras (2005)’s survey of adults with a history of criminal
18For state-by-state level data on such consequences, see the American Bar Association’s project at
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/
19Simply believing that an arrest or jail time prevents voting would not produce this pattern of results,
since everyone in my sample was arrested and so would be equally deterred. To create the difference we see
between arrestees sent to jail and those not sent to jail, there must be additional misinformation about jail
time (or at least convictions) preventing voting.
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justice involvement did not show substantially more misinformation around past jail terms
than around past arrests. It is possible that misinformation is in play, but I do not think it
is likely to drive all of the results presented here.
Another apparent possibility is that voters were still in jail at the time of the election,
but this is unlikely. The vast majority of these defendants would have been free at the
time of the 2012 election regardless of the sentence they received, as most misdemeanor jail
sentences in this data last a week or two. Only defendants who received exceptionally long
sentences or those who were sentenced very near the election (or those who were re-arrested)
would have been in jail at the time of the election itself.20 Dropping all cases filed in 2012
yields similar results and rules out this possibility for nearly all defendants.
A related mechanism would be re-arrest: if people who are sentenced to jail in their first
case become more likely to be re-arrested, the next election might find them in jail due to
another set of charges, or barred from voting due to a new felony conviction. This does not
appear to be the case in my data. In additional analysis in the SI, I instrument for felony
convictions or additional jail time that occurs after the first case but before the 2012 election
(using the same IV setup as in the main analysis). I find no evidence that people sentenced
to jail in their first cases become significantly more likely to be convicted of a felony or
sentenced to jail in a second case prior to the 2012 election. This is somewhat contrary to
existing work that has found recidivism effects from jail sentences, but I believe this is due
both to the nature of my sample (first-time defendants, not all criminal defendants) and the
brief time frame of my analysis (defendants charged in 2011, for example, would have had
little time to serve a jail sentence, be released, and then be re-arrested prior to the 2012
election).21
20Technically, misdemeanants can still vote even if jailed at the time of the election, and the county jail’s
handbook for inmates instructs those wanting to vote to contact the county clerk. In practice, it would be
surprising if jail inmates managed to request and return an absentee ballot.
21Relatively few of the defendants in my sample receive further jail sentences (12%) or felony convictions
(5%) by the 2012 election.
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Timing and Effect Persistence
The main analysis presents results from several years of misdemeanor cases, and finds
that jail decreases 2012 voter turnout among black defendants. Do these short-term effects
persist beyond the next presidential election? To answer this question, I use data from earlier
years of misdemeanor cases, continuing to measure voting in 2012. If the effect is persistent,
I should still see diminished 2012 turnout from misdemeanor charges filed in earlier years.
Using additional years of courtroom data comes with some concerns. First, it is possible
that courtroom procedures have changed dramatically over time, such that it would be
inappropriate to group together many years of data. Second, the possibility of differential
attrition (that people assigned to harsher courtrooms become more likely to move out of state
and thus to not appear in the voter file due to their move, not to any political withdrawal)
is an even bigger concern. Even regular attrition, in which people are equally likely to
move out of state regardless of their courtroom assignment, could be a problem, as it would
introduce noise that could attenuate the estimated effects.
However, Harris County’s court system appears to have been relatively consistent over
the past decade.22 In this section, I re-run the main analysis for all defendants and for black
defendants alone, this time including all first-time misdemeanor charges filed between 2000
and the 2012 election. Table 2.4 presents these 2SLS estimates. The first two columns of
the table estimate the effect of jail on 2012 voting for all defendants; Column 1 is based
on 2000-2012 data, while Column 2 is based on 2000-2008 only. Columns 3 and 4 present
estimates for black defendants only, from 2000-2012 and 2000-2008 respectively. For both
sets of defendants, the estimates fall short of statistical significance when I restrict to the
pre-2008 election period. However, the estimated coefficients remain large and negative,
suggesting the possibility of persistent effects through time. As in the main analyses, black
defendants show a larger, clearer pattern of deterrence.
22Major changes, such as the creation of new courtrooms and the implementation of computerized case
assignment, as well as the building of new jail facilities, took place in the 1990’s, prior to the data I present
here.
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Table 2.4: IV estimates: Jail sentences on voting, 2000-2012
Dependent variable:
vote2012
All defendants Black defendants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
jail  0.034  0.024  0.077  0.046
(0.023) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047)
Constant 0.170 0.163 0.284 0.264
(0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.032)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F-Statistic 5950.73 2453.71 135.41 88.59
2009-2012 data included Yes No Yes No
Observations 347,896 238,868 93,249 62,953
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.007 0.023 0.015
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
2.4.3 Voter History
The results presented in the previous section show very different effects of jail on black
and white defendants. This could be due to differing arrest patterns by race, with black
citizens more likely to face arrest than white ones. If black people face elevated risks of arrest
across the board, then black voters could be more likely to get swept into the criminal justice
system. It is possible that zealous policing tactics in black neighborhoods mean that there
are a higher proportion of regular voters among black defendants than white defendants.23
In this section, I look for evidence of such a difference.
I use data on voting in prior elections, as recorded in the Texas voter file. As noted
above, this file has complete voter turnout data for all registrants as of the 2012 election.
But prior election data may be less complete, as voters could have voted in those earlier
23This is not the only possible mechanism that could produce the racial differences I find. Black defendants
sentenced to jail could be treated differently in jail than white inmates, or could perceive their sentence
differently. Here, I present evidence consistent with one possible mechanism, but do not rule out these other
possibilities.
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elections but then been purged from the voter file for various reasons (such as inactivity
or death). This file provides a conservative measure of turnout in 2008, in the sense that
anyone who is reported as voting in 2008 almost certainly did, but some people who did vote
may not appear as voters in the data. Barring complex patterns of voter purging (such as
white voters being disproportionately likely to be dropped from the voter file after having
voted in 2008)24, this data provides a useful test of whether black defendants are more likely
to have been voters before their arrest.
Table 2.5: Differences in pre-arrest voter turnout by race
Dependent variable:
Turnout 2008 Turnout 2008
Black 0:084 0:090
(0:002) (0:002)
Male  0:042
(0:002)
Over 30 0:101
(0:002)
Charge severity 0:013
(0:002)
Constant 0:085 0:006
(0:001) (0:012)
Observations 113,415 113,274
R2 0.014 0.042
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.042
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Table 2.5 presents descriptive regression results that allow us to compare previous voter
turnout across race. Black defendants are more likely to have voted in 2008, before their
24In fact, a 2012 lawsuit filed by LULAC (the League of United Latin American Citizens) claimed that
Harris county was disproportionately purging minority voters from the voting rolls. So this file may provide
an even more conservative measure of past voting for black voters than for white ones.
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arrests, than white defendants. The estimated difference, of about 8 percentage points, is
substantial: in the full dataset, 11 % of defendants had voted in 2008. Black defendants are
nearly twice as likely as white defendants to have voted prior to their arrest. This difference
underscores the racial differences in exposure to the criminal justice system that have been
pointed out by Pettit and Western (2004) and others. White people are less likely to be
arrested overall, and arrests are confined mainly to people who do not regularly vote. But
with more police presence and higher scrutiny of black neighborhoods, black people are more
likely to be arrested. With such high arrest rates, the pool of arrestees includes not only
socially-isolated, civically-detached people, but also more politically-engaged people. Black
voters get arrested and charged, and so it is possible for them to be deterred by jail.
This table does not show deliberate discrimination on the part of police or prosecutors;
I do not have data to assess why arrest rates are so much higher among black voters than
white voters. And this section’s analysis does not have the same causal interpretation as
the previous section. The IV estimates of jail’s effect on voting (for both black and white
defendants) are well-identified causal effects. The evidence presented here about why the
effects differ is observational. However, it is consistent with a narrative in which targeted
policing brings many black defendants into court, including some voters (so they can be
deterred), while lower arrest rates among whites mean that the white defendant pool rarely
includes voters (so there’s no deterrent effect, because the people jailed were unlikely to vote
anyway). These differences in vote history persist even when adjusting for other defendant
characteristics, such as age, gender, and charge severity (whether they were charged with a
class A misdemeanor).
This apparent difference in who gets arrested (black voters, but not white voters) could
have serious implications for political representation. We knew that black people were
disproportionately likely to be arrested, so even an overall effect of jail on voting for all de-
fendants could have meant that courts were deterring black potential voters more often than
white potential voters. But having more regular voters in the pool of black defendants than
among white defendants, such that there is a deterrent effect only among black defendants,
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means that jail sentences will only affect black voter turnout.
2.4.4 Robustness Checks
Placebo Test: post-election sentencing To see whether my IV setup tends to yield
spurious results, I run a placebo test. I re-run my main analysis for defendants with cases
filed from November 2012-October 2014. The outcome variable is still voter turnout in the
2012 election, so I should find no effect of post-election cases on election turnout. If I found
an “effect," that would throw my main results into question.
The naive OLS regression of 2012 voting on post-election jail sentences yields a large
negative estimate, underscoring the bias of OLS in this setting. People who voted in the
2012 election are apparently more successful at interacting with the court system, and this
unobserved difference in defendants yields a spurious estimated “effect" of post-election
sentencing on pre-arrest voting.
In contrast, I do not find any statistically or substantively significant effects of post-
election cases on voter turnout in my IV analyses of all defendants. These estimates appear
in Table 2.6. The first-stage F-statistics suggest that the instrument is strong enough to be
used, despite there being fewer available post-election observations than I used in my main
analysis. The point estimates are small and vary in direction between the overall sample
and the racial subsets. These null results are reassuring: they provide one piece of evidence
that my main analytical approach is not producing spurious results.
Non-focal treatments One possible threat to inference here is the violation of the exclu-
sion restriction presented by other courtroom “treatments." The estimates presented above
rely on the assumption that the only way courtroom assignment affects voter turnout is
through jail sentencing. But if courtrooms do other things that could deter voting, and
these other “non-focal treatments" are correlated with their jail sentencing tendencies, the
above estimates could be biased (Mueller-Smith 2014).
What kinds of other treatments could courtrooms provide? Jail time seems like the
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Table 2.6: Placebo IV estimates: Jail on pre-arrest voting
Dependent variable:
vote2012
All Defendants Black Defendants White Defendants
(1) (2) (3)
jail  0.009 0.060 0.0001
(0.044) (0.086) (0.043)
Constant 0.104 0.129 0.075
(0.025) (0.047) (0.025)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F-Statistic 519.9 124.93 398.1
Observations 48,570 14,041 32,440
Adjusted R2 0.003  0.028  0.0001
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
most extreme punishment a misdemeanor courtroom can hand out, and so is likely to loom
large. However, courtrooms make other decisions as well: defendants can be convicted or not
convicted, assessed fines, or put on probation. And people’s actual time in the courtroom
could matter: in theory, defendants’ interactions with judges and prosecutors could deter
them from voting.25
Any of these non-focal treatments could matter for voting, but they only threaten the
jail estimates if these treatments are correlated with jail sentencing. In that case, a person
assigned to a given courtroom gets a “bundle" of treatments, which includes higher or lower
risk of being sentenced to jail time, but also includes higher or lower risk of conviction,
fines, probation, etc. Therefore, one simple way of assessing the threat posed by these other
treatments is simply to examine whether they are correlated with jail sentencing tendencies.
I look at the correlations between courtroom-year-specific rates of different case out-
25In practice, time spent in the courtroom is brief and confusing for most defendants: there is unlikely to
be much variation. Each courtroom handles dozens of cases per day, and defendants are rarely in front of
the judge for more than a few minutes.
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comes. Courtrooms’ tendency to assess fines is essentially uncorrelated with jail sentencing,
at .05. Similarly, sentencing to probation is only slightly correlated with sentencing to jail,
at -0.09. The negative correlation there indicates that if probation did deter defendants
from voting, my estimates of jail on voting would actually be understating the true effect.
However, courtrooms’ conviction tendencies are more related to jail sentencing, with
a correlation of .45.26 If being convicted of a misdemeanor offense deters voting (either
because people feel they have lost some part of their citizenship, or because they mistakenly
believe such a conviction bars them from voting), then the above estimates for jail could be
biased upwards. I address this concern both qualitatively and quantitatively below.
First, there are reasons to think that jail sentences are qualitatively more memorable than
misdemeanor convictions. First-hand and journalistic accounts, along with qualitative social
science research, bolster the idea that jail time is a formative and memorable experience
for those sentenced to even short periods of confinement. Local jail conditions are often
described as worse than prison conditions, marked by chaos, crowding, and a transient
population (Irwin 1985). As sparse as “enrichment" programs such as work opportunities
or educational programs may be in prisons, they are essentially nonexistent in jails. The
social landscape is chaotic and sometimes threatening. The high suicide rate in local jails,
which exceeds the prison suicide rate, is a testiment to the dire circumstances of jail inmates
(Noonan et al. 2013).
Harris County jails are no exception to this pattern of chaotic, under-resourced jail
experiences. The county jail population has been increasing since the 1970’s, and even after
the construction of new jail facilities in the 1990’s, the system rapidly approached maximum
capacity again (Mahoney and Nugent-Borakove 2009).27 Many people in the jail have mental
health or substance abuse problems; the jail is the county’s largest de facto mental health
care provider. A 2009 letter from the Department of Justice following an investigation into
the jail stated that “the Jail fails to provide detainees with adequate: (1) medical care;
26This is not surprising, as conviction is a necessary prerequisite for jail sentencing.
27Some jail inmates are now sent to other Texas counties, or to Louisiana, to reduce crowding.
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(2) mental health care; (3) protection from serious physical harm; and (4) protection from
life safety hazards." (Division 2009). In addition, there have been a number of high-profile
unexplained deaths in county jail facilities (Hunter 2009). Given these conditions, I find it
plausible that even a short stay in jail could seriously change people’s view of government
and their willingness to vote.
Next, I subset the data to focus on courtrooms with similar conviction rates but variation
in jail sentencing tendencies. In a set of analyses reported in the SI, I automatically construct
subsets of the data from 10, 15, or 20 courtroom-years with the most similar conviction rates.
Many of these subsets, despite their courtrooms having similar conviction rates, still show
variation in jail-sentencing rates (my instrument). I rerun the main analyses on as many of
these automatically-generated subsets as possible (dropping subsets where the first stage is
too weak, with an F-statistic of less than 10), and demonstrate that even in these smaller
subsets, most estimates are still negative and comparable to the main results. That the
estimated effects of jail on voting persist even when there is relatively little variation in
conviction rates supports the idea that jail (not conviction) is the main causal pathway
through which courtrooms affect voting.
Finally, I also present the reduced-form estimates of the courtroom-assignment instru-
ment’s effect on voting. Even if one does not believe the exclusion restriction that allows me
to attribute the courtroom effect entirely to jail sentencing, these estimates of courtroom
effects on voter turnout have a causal interpretation. These reduced-form estimates do not
require us to assume that jail is the only causal pathway through which courtrooms affect
voting. However, if we do believe the exclusion restriction, we can think of these effects as
a mixture of the (large) effects for compliers, and the null effects for everyone unaffected by
courtroom assignment.
For black defendants, these overall courtroom effects are significant and striking. Table
2.7 displays estimates from an OLS regression of 2012 voter turnout onto the courtroom-
assignment instrument, demonstrating that courtroom assignment does have a clear effect
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on my outcome of interest.28 Figure 2.3 presents first differences based on the reduced form.
Even if we can’t be completely certain that jail is the only mechanism at play, it is clear
that variations in one’s randomly-assigned courtroom can shape later political behavior.
2.4.5 Substantive Importance
The main results point to a large decrease in voter turnout for black defendants sen-
tenced to jail. The question remains of how substantively important this effect is, and how
many voters could actually be deterred by jail terms. This question has two components:
first, how does the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) estimated for compliers in this
sample generalize to the rest of the sample, or to defendants outside Harris County? And
second, how many first-time misdemeanor defendants are there, both in Harris County and
nationwide, that could face demobilization from jail sentencing?
Generalizing LATE I begin by characterizing black compliers, using the few pre-treatment
characteristics available from court records. In an analysis in the SI, I dichotomize the court-
room instrument (split it at the median value into high-jail-rate and low-jail-rate courtrooms)
and present some of the characteristics of compliers relative to the whole sample. Compliers
are somewhat more likely to be male, are younger than the average defendant, and are less
likely to have been charged with a class A (more serious) misdemeanor.
Then, I reweight the complier population to resemble the entire population of black
defendants (Aronow and Carnegie 2013). With some distributional assumptions, along
with ignorability of compliance (the idea that the treatment effect for a given covariate
profile should be the same across compliers and non-compliers), this approach should return
an Average Treatment Effect (ATE) for the entire sample, rather than a complier-specific
LATE. This analysis is presented in full in the SI. Using this approach, I estimate an ATE of
-.19 for black defendants in Harris County (slightly larger than the complier-specific LATE
28The coefficients do not have a practical interpretation in this case, as they represent the change in
turnout that would be expected if moving from a courtroom that jails 0% of defendants to one that jails
100%.
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Figure 2.3: Simulated first differences based on the reduced form: these show the predicted
change in voter turnout for defendants if they were to be moved from the courtroom with
the lowest to the highest incarceration tendency.
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estimated in Section 2.4.2).
On the question of how Harris County defendants differ from those in other jurisdictions,
there is very little concrete data available. There is no national source of data on misde-
meanor defendants and jail sentencing (Boruchowitz, Brink, and Dimino 2009). Qualitative
reports suggest that the experience of going to jail in Harris county is not atypical for local
jails anywhere in the country, though the Harris County jail system is particularly large.
Eligible Population If we think the LATE estimated from the Harris County sample
(or the reweighted ATE presented above) can be reasonably applied beyond compliers, the
question remains: how many people could be affected? I examine this question first for
Harris County, then make some nationwide estimates.
In Harris County, my sample of black defendants consists of about 30,000 black first-time
misdemeanor defendants whose cases were filed between the 2008 and 2012 election, of whom
just over 16,000 were sentenced to jail. If the LATE estimated above holds for all of these
defendants, then roughly 2,100 black defendants were deterred from voting in 2012, due to
jail sentences received in the four years prior. If the covariate-reweighted ATE holds, the
number of demobilized voters rises to about 3,100. These are significant numbers of voters
for local elections, even in a large county. In the November 2012 election, for example, two
of the judgeships in the Harris Civil Courts at Law (different from the Criminal Courts
at Law discussed in this paper) were on the ballot. These were both tight elections; the
Republican candidate for Courtroom 1 won the race by under 4,000 votes. The decision of
several thousand black voters to stay home could sway tight elections like this one. And
even without reversing election outcomes, the withdrawal of thousands of black voters from
the electorate could lead to different patterns of representation and policy outcomes.
It is harder to know how many people could be affected by misdemeanor jail sentences
nationally. There is little national data on misdemeanor charges or jail sentencing, so I
present a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on jail admissions data from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics. The assumptions made are discussed further in the SI. Briefly, I begin with
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the 11.6 million people who are estimated to have been admitted to local jails in 2012, and
adjust that number to reflect the possibility of individual arrestees being double-counted,
the proportion of jail inmates who are black, the proportion of jail inmates that have not
been convicted of misdemeanors (either because they are awaiting trial or because they
are serving felony sentences in local jails), and the proportion of misdemeanants that are
first-time offenders. This yields an estimate of about 300,000 black first-time misdemeanor
defendants sentenced to time in local jails each year, or about 1.2 million between the 2008
and 2012 elections.
An alternative approach is to look at Harris County’s first-time misdemeanor jail rate
for black residents, and extend that rate to the entire US. The 16,000 black first-time misde-
meanor defendants sentenced to jail between the 2008 and 2012 elections represented about
1.8% of Harris County’s black population. If we assume black residents across the US expe-
rience misdemeanor jail sentences at the same rate, this would mean just over 765,000 people
were sentenced to jail based on a first misdemeanor case nationally, fewer than estimated
from the BJS data above.
Thus, estimates of the affected population range from 765,000 to 1.2 million. If they faced
the same rates of demobilization estimated in the main analysis (a drop of 16 percentage
points), this would mean somewhere between 100,000 and 156,000 black Americans stayed
home from the polls in the 2012 election due to jail sentences served during that election
cycle. If we instead use the covariate-reweighted ATE estimated above, then the estimated
number of demobilized voters rises, to between 145,000 and 228,000.29 These are loosely-
estimated quantities, but they suggest that a staggering number of black potential voters
stayed home in 2012 due to misdemeanor jail sentences.
29For comparison, this is similar in size to the entire black voting population of Washington, DC.
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2.5 Conclusion
Jail sentences arising from misdemeanor cases decrease voter turnout in the next election,
especially for black defendants. The effects presented in this paper are strikingly large, and
have a causal interpretation. Further, jail sentences disproportionately deter black voters,
suggesting that seemingly minor criminal cases could have major racial implications for
democratic representation.
Although this analytic setup depends on a criminal court system with random assignment
to courtrooms, the results generalize beyond Texas’ county courts. In court systems with
only one judge or without random assignment, we can imagine that small differences in a
judge’s mood or calendar could lead to sentencing variation that deters voting. And even
in the absence of such arbitrary variation–even in cases where multiple judges would likely
agree on the jail sentence imposed–the result that jail deters voting could well hold. The
“compliers" in this IV analysis differ from the general defendant population in that they
fell into a realm of sentencing uncertainty (though they themselves might not know this).
But to the extent they are similar to other defendants on characteristics that drive voting
propensity, the effects identified for these compliers should hold for many other defendants
as well. In this case, the impact on voter turnout could be massive: misdemeanor cases are
incredibly common across the country, and hundreds of thousands of short jail terms are
given out each year.
As noted above, the jail sentences distributed to misdemeanor defendants in Harris
County are usually quite short: most range from a few days to several weeks. That these
sentences shape voter turnout in the next election is quite striking. That the effect may
persist through multiple election cycles implies that such sentences could have immense
effects on voter turnout. If voters simply drop out of the electorate for a decade or more
after receiving such a sentence, then the political effects of sentencing could build up over
time.
Finally, jail’s disproportionate effect on black turnout has major implications for the
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makeup of the electorate. African-Americans are already disproportionately represented in
the criminal justice system, so even an equally-sized effect of jail on voting would result in
a larger fraction of black voters being deterred. But that the effect is actually larger for
black defendants (in addition to their being more likely to face such jail terms) means that
the effect of jail on voting will be even more pronounced for black voters. In areas with
extremely high levels of criminal justice contact, this could lead to major drops in voter
turnout. As noted above, the persistence of jail’s effect on voting mean that misdemeanor
sentencing could be producing low black turnout in such areas for years to come.
Further research is still warranted on how defendants view these misdemeanor jail sen-
tences, and how short stints in local jail differ from longer prison terms in their political
effects. Another avenue of investigation is the possible “spillovers" of such sentences: do de-
fendants’ family members or neighbors also reduce their political participation in the wake
of short jail sentences (Lee, Porter, and Comfort 2013; Walker 2014)? Future research will
exploit the same court-assignment design to examine jail’s effect on the voter turnout of
people that are socially or geographically close to defendants.
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3 | Locking Up The Vote:
Household spillover effects of incarceration
3.1 Introduction
Millions of Americans have had the experience of seeing a family member or close friend
incarcerated. Wildeman (2009) estimates that by 1990, the risk of parental incarceration
had risen to 4% of white children and over 25% of black children. Seven percent of women
responding to the nationally-representative National Sexual Health Survey reported that
they had a primary male partner who had been to prison or jail (Comfort et al. 2005).
Incarceration can shape a range of life outcomes for the families and social networks
of people sentenced to jail or prison time. Children of incarcerated parents do worse in
school, face higher rates of mental health problems and mortality, and are more likely to
be incarcerated themselves (Johnson 2009; Wakefield and Wildeman 2013; Lee, Fang, and
Luo 2013). Adults whose romantic partners are incarcerated face emotional stress as well as
financial strain, as they try to pay for visits and phone calls to their loved one on a single
income (Grinstead et al. 2001; Comfort 2008).
What about political participation? Does the incarceration of a household member,
whether it’s a family member, romantic partner or perhaps a roommate/friend, change
people’s political behavior? Survey evidence on the political participation of people with
incarcerated loved ones has been mixed, depending on the sample used, the type of rela-
tionship examined, the kind of carceral experience measured, and the political outcomes
collected.
In this paper, I measure the effect of “proximal contact" to incarceration using adminis-
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trative data rather than survey responses, and focus on a fairly common experience: having
a member of one’s household spend a short time in jail due to a misdemeanor conviction.
Using a dataset from one large county court system, I geolocate misdemeanor defendants
and then rely on the state’s voter file to find registered voters who lived at the same address
as a defendant. This allows for a broader sample, as well as more reliable measure of voter
turnout and incarceration than would be available from surveys.
I find evidence that voters whose household member was incarcerated before the 2012
general election were less likely to vote in that election than voters whose housemate faced
charges but was not sentenced to jail. This is true even when I adjust for covariates such
as voting in prior elections, and when I use genetic matching to construct demographically-
comparable groups of “treated" and “untreated" voters. I also take advantage of the random
assignment of defendants to courtrooms, using courtroom assignments as instrumental vari-
ables to find the causal effect of jail on household members voting, and find similar estimates.
These results underscore the political importance of incarceration in an era of record
penal populations. This paper carefully measures just one part of a much larger effect,
the net effect of criminal justice contact (from police encounters to arrest to probation or
incarceration) on the families and friends of those targeted. This paper draws a narrow
definition of proximal contact, and then estimates the marginal effect of seeing a household
member jailed among people who have already had a lot of contact with the criminal justice
system (seeing their housemate arrested and criminally charged). That I find substantial
effects of jail on household members’ voting, even when focusing on people that have already
experienced some proximal contact, suggests that the larger cumulative effect of criminal
justice contact is larger still.
3.2 Incarceration and Political Participation
Interactions with the criminal justice system, especially time spent behind bars, have
been shown to reduce political participation (and to change views of government) among
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people who directly experience them (Fairdosi 2009; Weaver and Lerman 2010, 2014; White
2015). But what about people who have “proximal contact" (Walker 2014) with the system
through family, friends, or neighbors? Do they become less likely to undertake political
action, either because of the practical costs that incarceration imposes on households or
because of alienation or distrust in government (Weaver and Lerman 2014; Lee, Porter, and
Comfort 2013; Burch 2013)? Or do they instead become politically activated, as people who
are somewhat shielded from the actual experience of incarceration but still see it as a threat
to their community (Walker 2014)?
Existing work describes a number of mechanisms by which proximal criminal justice con-
tact could reduce political participation, as well as ideas of when these mechanisms may or
may not operate. Lee, Porter, and Comfort (2013) divides these mechanisms into indirect
(transmitted through the incarcerated loved one) and direct effects of familial incarcera-
tion. Indirect mechanisms could include political socialization (your family member tells
you about the criminal legal system and changes your view of government or your sense of
efficacy) as well as modeled behavior (your family member becomes less likely to vote or fol-
low politics and you follow their lead). Direct mechanisms include the stresses incarceration
places on a household (time spent dealing with criminal cases or visiting jail or prison, loss
of a wage earner, emotional tension), or the “secondary prisonization" that happens when
families adapt to the structures of the prison system and become less accustomed to other
state structures (Lee, Porter, and Comfort 2013; Comfort 2008). People may also withdraw
from political and civic life due to shame and the stigma that surrounds incarceration, or
may change their views of government due to having seen the state incarcerate their loved
one (Weaver and Lerman 2014).
However, Walker (2014) hypothesizes that this sort of proximal contact might not always
lead to withdrawal. Focusing not only on immediate family but anyone who reports that a
friend or family member has had criminal justice contact,1 Walker (2014) notes that some
1The survey question asks “And what about someone you know, such as a close friend or family member?
Do you know someone who has been arrested, charged, or questioned by the police, even if they were not
guilty, excluding minor traffic stops such as speeding?"
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people who do not bear the direct costs of this contact might not be politically demobilized.
Instead, drawing on the literature on mobilization in response to threat, Walker (2014)
proposes that members of groups that are disproportionately targeted by the criminal justice
system, such as young black men, might be moved to push back on this system by becoming
even more politically involved.
The argument in Walker (2014) does not focus on voting so much as on other forms
of political turnout (protest, contacting officials, etc.), but the paper nonetheless reports a
null effect on voting: seeing a friend or family member face criminal justice contact does
not decrease voter turnout at all.2 Is this null finding a survey artifact, driven by a strange
sample or by the characteristics of respondents that are willing to admit to having proximal
contact? Or is it because this survey uses a looser definition of proximity than earlier studies
of family members have done, as well as a lower bar for criminal justice contact?
The disparate results of prior papers suggest that more work is needed to accurately
measure various kinds of proximal contact and test their effects on participation. I further
this goal by using a large sample not dependent on survey response, and by carefully defining
a well-measured treatment and a distance-based measure of proximal contact. I also use a
treatment (exposure to short jail terms from misdemeanor crimes) that presents in many
ways a hard test of the hypothesis that proximal contact can reduce participation, as I
discuss further in Section 3.4.
2Similarly, Burch (2013)’s analysis of neighborhoods with incarcerated residents show mixed results, with
some specifications finding that neighborhoods where someone was incarcerated before an election had lower
voter turnout and others finding no effect (p. 90).
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3.3 Using Administrative Data to Measure Contact
3.3.1 Setup
I begin with public records from the Harris County (Texas) criminal courts at law, which
hear all misdemeanor cases in the county (including those from the city of Houston).3 These
records contain information on nearly all misdemeanor cases filed in recent years, including
the charges faced, the date of the case, name and other identifying information about the
defendant, and case disposition and sentencing.4 I focus on first-time misdemeanor cases
filed between 2009 and 2012 (before the 2012 election), in which the defendant has a valid
address within Harris County on file. I then use the recorded addresses of these defendants
to precisely geocode their residences.5
Next, I find household members of these defendants within the Texas state voter file,
which contains the addresses of all registered voters. I geocode all voters within Harris
County and then find any registered voters who live within five meters of one of the geocoded
misdemeanor defendants. To avoid including all residents of large apartment complexes or
housing projects as “household members" of a given defendant, I omit all addresses with
more than 10 registered voters at that address. I also ensure that no actual misdemeanor
defendants are included in the sample.6 This yields a sample of registered voters who lived
with a person charged with a misdemeanor between January 2009 and the 2012 general
election. Appendix A discusses the evidence that these voters genuinely have some relation-
ship with the defendants to which they’ve been matched; many appear to be close family
members.
3Records were requested from the District Clerk’s office and are publicly searchable at the District Clerk’s
website: http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com
4A very small number of cases may not appear in this dataset due to having been sealed. This appears
to be extremely uncommon (Mueller-Smith 2014).
5I geocode using ArcMap 10. See the Supplemental Appendix for additional geocoding details.
6Some of the defendants are themselves registered voters and so appear in the voter file. I find and
remove them based on last name and birthdate matches at each address.
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This dataset allows me to compare voters whose housemates were sentenced to jail time
to those whose household members faced misdemeanor charges but were not ultimately
jailed. Thus I can observe the marginal effect of housemates’ jail time, not the total effect
of having a household member arrested, charged, and ultimately incarcerated. Everyone in
this sample experienced a household member facing criminal charges.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Defendants Of the 182,562 people that faced misdemeanor charges for the first time in
2012, 90,606 of them were successfully geocoded to addresses in Harris County.7 Of these,
36,442 lived in a household with at least one registered voter.
The defendants in this sample were charged with misdemeanor crimes, which in Texas
carry up to one year’s penal sentence.8 In practice, 66% of them were ultimately convicted
of a crime, and 45% were sentenced to some jail time. But most sentences were short: the
median length of sentence was 10 days, and only 39% of jailed defendants were sentenced
to a month or more in jail. Certainly this is a long enough time for proximal contact
to seriously affect housemates’ lives, but it is unlikely that some of the longer-term life
disruptions described by prison ethnographers would happen over this time frame (Comfort
2008; Wacquant 2000).
Voters 87,591 registered voters in Harris County lived at the same address as someone
who faced misdemeanor charges in 2012. Table 3.1 compares these voters’ characteristics
to the entire universe of registered voters in the county. Compared to all registered voters,
those living with defendants are younger and have been registered to vote for less time. They
are also less likely to have voted in prior elections, even before their household member was
arrested. Still, turnout rates for this group are far higher than turnout found among people
7Defendants that could not be geocoded were either recorded as homeless, did not have any address on
file, or had malformed or extremely vague addresses on file. Many others had valid addresses outside of the
county.
8Common case types for these courtrooms include driving while intoxicated, theft, possession of small
amounts of marijuana, and certain types of (non-aggravated) assault.
75
with direct criminal justice contact in prior studies (Burch 2010; Haselswerdt 2009; White
2015). This could allow for much larger demobilizing effects among family members than
have been seen for incarcerated people themselves.
Registered voters living with defendants are also less likely to have voted in the 2012
election than the general public. In the next section, I focus on the set of voters living with
defendants and ask whether seeing a housemate go to jail makes one even less likely to vote.
Proximal Contact Sample All Voters
Voter Turnout 2012 0.46 0.55
Prior Voter Turnout (2008) 0.42 0.53
Mean Age (Years) 42.09 46.10
Proportion Male 0.47 0.46
Mean Time Registered (Years) 10.10 11.48
Table 3.1: Comparing the sample used in this paper to the full set of registered voters in
Harris County.
3.3.3 Regression Analysis
In this section, I ask whether voters whose household member spends time in jail become
less likely to vote in the next election. First, I run a simple regression model predicting
registered voters’ 2012 voter turnout with a dummy variable for whether their housemate
was sent to jail for any length of time.9 In the subsequent columns of Table 3.2, additional
covariates are included in the analysis. Column 2 includes the voter’s prior turnout in the
two preceding congressional elections; Column 3 adds in some demographic information
about their household member, and Column 4 includes the age and gender of the voters
themselves.10
9I focus on defendants’ first misdemeanors and do not follow up, so it is possible that some small subset
of voters whose housemate wasn’t jailed the first time could still have seen their housemate go to jail in a
subsequent case. This should make the estimates presented here conservative.
10This is an individual-level analysis at the level of the voter, but all results are robust to clustering
standard errors at the level of the criminal defendant, to account for the fact that several voters could live
with the same defendant.
76
Across these specifications, I estimate a substantively large, statistically-significant de-
crease in voter turnout associated with having a household member incarcerated (relative to
having them face criminal charges, but not go to jail). These results are robust to including
geographic fixed effects at the level of the zip code, state house district, or state senate
district, as reported in Appendix B. They are also robust to including various census-tract
level covariates from the 2010 Census, such as population, percent Black or Latino, and
average household size (table in Appendix B).
We might wonder whether this is a short-term effect: do people avoid voting six months
after a housemate is jailed, but return to voting two or three years later? Table 3.3 presents
estimates from year-specific regression models: the effect of having a housemate jailed in
2009, 2010, 2011, or 2012 on 2012 voting. The estimates do not appear to drop off substan-
tially over the four year period, suggesting that there is a lasting deterrent effect. Future
work will extend these estimates further into the past to see whether the effect persists
beyond one presidential election cycle.
3.3.4 Matching
We may worry that households whose members are jailed differ (across a number of
dimensions) from those whose members are not jailed, and that the OLS estimates above
could be extrapolating beyond the range of the data. In this section, I use genetic matching
to prune the set of “untreated" voters (those whose household members avoided jail) to
those that most closely resemble the “treated" households on a range of individual, house-
hold, and neighborhood-level variables. I use genetic matching (Sekhon 2011) to match on
voters’ age, gender, prior vote history (2008 and 2010) and housemate race and gender,
performing one-to-one matching with replacement. After constructing this more-balanced
sample (see plots in the supplemental appendix for evidence of improved covariate balance),
I non-parametrically estimate the effect of having a household member go to jail. These
estimates look extremely similar to the OLS estimates presented in the prior section: seeing
a household member jailed reduces voter turnout by about 2.9 percentage points.
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Table 3.2: Basic OLS estimates, including prior vote, defendant and voter characteristics
Dependent variable:
vote2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Member Jailed  0:054  0:025  0:026  0:026
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
2008 Turnout 0:491 0:483 0:481
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
HH Member Black 0:071
(0:003)
HH Member Male 0:006
(0:003)
HH Member Age (Years) 0:00000
(0:00000)
Voter Male  0:042
(0:003)
Voter Age (Years) 0:001
(0:0001)
Constant 0:482 0:262 0:235 0:257
(0:002) (0:002) (0:005) (0:004)
Observations 87,591 87,591 87,459 86,241
R2 0.003 0.238 0.242 0.242
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.238 0.242 0.242
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table 3.3: OLS estimates by year of household member’s criminal case
Dependent variable:
vote2012
2009 2010 2011 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Member Jailed  0:025  0:030  0:025  0:032
(0:006) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
2008 Turnout 0:473 0:487 0:485 0:477
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
Voter Male  0:045  0:044  0:053  0:032
(0:006) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007)
Voter Age (Years) 0:001 0:0005 0:001 0:001
(0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0002) (0:0002)
Constant 0:236 0:267 0:280 0:254
(0:010) (0:010) (0:010) (0:010)
Observations 18,782 17,759 16,951 16,205
R2 0.240 0.247 0.245 0.238
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.246 0.245 0.238
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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3.3.5 IV: Random Courtroom Assignment
We might still worry that these estimates do not have a causal interpretation, because
lower voter turnout among people with proximal contact could be caused by some unobserved
variable and not the spillover effects of jail sentences. In this section, I present estimates
from an instrumental-variables (IV) analysis intended to address these concerns. In this
design, I take advantage of the random assignment process used to distribute misdemeanor
cases to the 15 misdemeanor courtrooms within Harris County. These courtrooms differ
substantially in how frequently they sentence defendants to jail, so being sent to a “harsh"
courtroom rather than a more “lenient" one at random can make a defendant much more
likely to be receive a jail sentence. This yields a quasi-experiment: some people get sent
to jail essentially because they had the bad luck to be sent to a harsher courtroom, while
others walk free because of a lucky draw.11
I use the fact that defendants are randomly assigned to these harsher or more lenient
courtrooms to instrument for whether they receive a jail sentence at all.12 Table K.1 in
Appendix C presents first-stage results, demonstrating that courtroom assignment really
does affect jail sentencing. As an illustrative example, in 2012 the 15 different courtrooms
sentenced people to jail at extremely different rates, ranging from 47% to 61%. This was
not driven by differences in defendant characteristics, as defendants were randomly assigned
to courtrooms, yielding very similar caseloads across the different courtrooms.13
When I use courtroom assignment as an instrument for housemates being jailed, I find
estimates of jail on voter turnout that are substantively similar to the main estimates in
Section 3.3.3, though somewhat noisier. Figure 3.1 presents IV estimates of housemate jail
11See Mueller-Smith (2014) and White (2015) for other designs taking advantage of random courtroom
assignment in Harris County in particular; see Kling (2006) and Green and Winik (2010) for similar IV
designs in other contexts.
12Because I am interested in the behavior of registered voters who live with defendants, it is more accurate
to say that I use housemates’ courtroom assignment to instrument for whether a voter sees their housemate
sent to jail.
13For balance tests and more evidence of genuinely random assignment in this data, see Mueller-Smith
(2014) and White (2015).
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on 2012 voter turnout from several specifications (described in further detail in Appendix C).
In all cases, the estimates are negative and similar in size to (or somewhat larger than) the
OLS estimates. This lends further support to the causal interpretation of these estimates.
3.4 Interpretation
What can these results tell us about the net effect of criminal justice contact on friends
and family members? In this section, I first discuss how common the examined experience
(watching a household member go to jail over misdemeanor crimes) is, and how many voters
may be deterred by having this experience, both in the examined county and across the
United States. Then, I discuss what these results can and cannot tell us about the broader
set of experiences that make up proximal contact.
Within the area of this study (Harris County, Texas), I identified over 87,000 registered
voters who saw a household member face misdemeanor charges between 2009 and 2012, with
over 38,000 watching that person go to jail. This is likely an undercount of the number of
people who actually saw loved ones arrested, since it does not account for people who are
not registered, who do not live with their partner or family member, or who live with a
defendant who did not have a valid address on record with the court. Still, applying the
estimated three-percentage-point decrease in turnout to the families in the sample who saw
members jailed suggests that over a thousand voters stayed home from the polls in this
county due to brief misdemeanor jail sentences.
It is harder to know how many people could be proximally affected by misdemeanor jail
sentences nationwide. There is little national data on misdemeanor charges or jail sentencing,
so I present a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on jail admissions data from the Bureau
of Justice Statistics. The assumptions made are discussed further in the SI. Briefly, I begin
with the 11.6 million people estimated to have been admitted to local jails in 2012, and
adjust that number to reflect the possibility of individual arrestees being double-counted,
the proportion of jail inmates that have not been convicted of misdemeanors (either because
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Figure 3.1: Using random courtroom assignment as an instrument for whether a household
member goes to jail.
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they are awaiting trial or because they are serving felony sentences in local jails), and the
proportion of misdemeanants that are first-time offenders. This yields an estimate of over
800,000 first-time misdemeanor defendants sentenced to time in local jails each year. If close
to half of these defendants live with a registered voter (as seen in Harris County) and these
voters are demobilized at the same rates estimated in Section 3.3.3, this could translate into
over 10,000 voters across the US staying home from the polls after seeing a loved one jailed
for a misdemeanor crime in a given year. Table 3.3 suggests that this demobilization can
persist for multiple years, so the true effect may be several times that size.
These estimates are not meant to capture the entire set of spillover effects that could oc-
cur due to criminal justice contact. Instead, they capture one very narrow part of the effect.
These estimates do not include people whose loved ones faced felony (not misdemeanor)
convictions, or who don’t live with their loved one. They do not address the question of
cumulative effects, as people continue not voting over time or see more people in their lives
jailed. They do not include longer-term effects driven by people who weren’t registered
voters, but might have registered in the future if they hadn’t been deterred by proximal
contact.14
Most importantly, these estimates capture the additional effect of seeing a household
member jailed after already having seen them face charges. This is the incremental, ad-
ditional effect of the jail term among people who have already borne the costs of having
a household member arrested and charged with a misdemeanor. That I still find an effect
of jail among people who have experienced other forms of criminal justice contact under-
scores the continuing importance of incarceration in people’s political lives. Even short jail
sentences loom large in the lives of those close to the incarcerated.
14This consideration may be especially important for the children of incarcerated parents, who face early
political socialization around the criminal legal system.
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3.5 Conclusion
With close to 25% of the American public carrying the stigma of a criminal record, mil-
lions of Americans know someone who has been arrested, convicted of a crime, or incarcer-
ated. These experiences are particularly pervasive for African-Americans and for low-income
people. If even a fraction of the family members or close friends of people with criminal
justice contact are deterred from voting, this could translate into massive distortions in
the makeup of the American electorate. This could lead to policy feedbacks in which the
most-heavily-targeted communities withdraw from political life, and incarceration decisions
continue to be made without their political input (Bruch, Ferree, and Soss 2010; Campbell
2002).
This paper has measured just a sliver of possible effects from proximal contact, focusing
on the immediate housemates of people jailed for misdemeanor crimes and estimating the
additional effect of jail after having already experienced arrest. Even with such a narrow
focus, I find substantial demobilizing effects: people become several percentage points less
likely to vote in the next presidential election if their household member is sentenced to jail.
These results are robust to a variety of specifications, and are similar to estimates derived
from a quasi-experimental approach based on random courtroom assignment.
It is worth noting that this demobilization is occurring among people who have not
themselves committed a crime.15 Such “collateral consequences" raise normative questions
about the representativeness of American democracy.
That said, voter turnout may be only one part of the proximal contact story. As Walker
(2014) and others point out, voting is only one piece of a range of political activities available
to the family and household members of people trapped in the criminal justice system.
The question, then, is whether voting is only the tip of the iceberg, indicating a broader
15I have not directly measured whether the housemates of people who are jailed become themselves more
likely to be arrested, convicted, or jailed, but such a mechanism is unlikely to drive the entire estimated
effect; if such a mechanism were in play, we should not see an effect for voters whose housemates faced
charges in 2012 (as this leaves very little time for housemates to see the case play out and then go get
arrested).
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withdrawal from civic and political life: lower willingness to protest, to contact government
officials, or even to request needed services (Lerman and Weaver 2013). Or is voting instead
one rare case amidst a swell of political activity by people with proximal contact? Future
work will seek to collect the other outcome measures necessary to estimate the full extent
of proximal contact’s political effects.
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A | Appendix to Chapter 1: Testing Assumptions/
Robustness Tests
Due to the limitations of the Catalist database and the ACS, I do not have reliable voter
turnout data for the years prior to 2006, which makes it difficult to test the assumptions
of the difference-in-differences setup. However, in this section I present several tests of the
assumptions based on the available data. I verify that pre-treatment trends in turnout do
not predict treatment, I run a placebo test to demonstrate that my approach does not find
treatment effects where none should exist, and I use synthetic matching to address concerns
that control units may not be similar enough to treated units.
Checking pre-treatment trends
First, we might worry that places that already had steeper growth in Latino turnout
might have also received the SC treatment for some reason, such that the effect I observe
is not actually driven by immigration enforcement. To test for this possibility, I use the
best available data from 2002 and 2006 to check whether the pre-treatment turnout trends
predict treatment. I construct 2002 voter turnout data slightly differently than the 2006 and
2010 data; I use CVAP estimates from the 2000 Census because the ACS did not produce
estimates of Latino CVAP prior to 2006 (and then interpolate using 2000 Census and 2006
ACS data to produce 2002 estimates).1 Further, Catalist began collecting voter files to
construct their database in 2006, so it is possible that their turnout data for prior years is
incomplete due to people voting and then being removed from the voter rolls before 2006.
1These estimates are available for about half of the jurisdictions in the main dataset.
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Both numerator and denominator are biased by an unknown amount, so it is not clear in
which direction the turnout estimates will be biased.
Table A.1 presents the results of a regression of the treatment variable onto the 2002-
2006 change in Latino turnout in each state cluster.2 There is no evidence that pre-2006
time trends, at least for the limited period for which there is data, predict treatment.
Table A.1: Predicting treatment with prior Latino turnout trends (including all jurisdictions)
2006 - 2002 Latino turnout (percentage points)  0.005
(0.004)
Constant 0.131
(0.051)
Observations 49
R2 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.004
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Next, I use another dataset to verify the parallel-trends assumption. I use Latino citizen
voter turnout rates from the Current Population Survey for elections from 1996 to 2006, and
check whether these turnout rates predict treatment (enrollment in the Secure Communities
Program). This analysis is shown in Table A.2.
I calculate Latino citizen turnout rates for each cluster as follows: I restrict the dataset
to jurisdictions that are included in my dataset for the above analyses (dropping places in
each state that voluntarily enrolled in SC). Then, for each “cluster" (roughly a state, but
with self-selected counties dropped), I calculate the percentage of Latino citizens of voting
2For the purposes of this test, I focus on full states, rather than on “state" clusters that omit jurisdictions
that selected into the SC program. I think this is more realistic, as treatment was determined at the state
level. However, the results do not change substantively if I omit the jurisdictions that voluntarily enrolled in
SC, as in the dataset used for the main analysis; there is still no significant relationship between 2002-2006
change in turnout and treatment at the state level. Similarly, no significant relationship emerges if I weight
the regression by the number of units in the state pre-collapse, or by the cluster’s 2002 Latino population.
Finally, no significant relationship emerges if I run the same analysis at the county level rather than the
state.
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age that report having turned out in the most recent election, using the survey weights
provided with the survey. The November CPS supplement asks about the general election
that has just taken place, so for some years it is the midterm congressional election, and in
others it is the presidential election.
Some clusters contained very few respondents, so the turnout estimates were quite noisy.
In Column (1) of Table A.2, I have dropped all clusters with fewer than 30 respondents;
Column (2) contains all clusters. In both cases, there is no evidence that previous years’
turnout rates predicted treatment, which supports the parallel trends assumption. Figure
A plots the Latino turnout trends of states with and without treated units.
Placebo test: 2002-2006
Having constructed Latino turnout estimates from 2002 for some of the jurisdictions
from the main dataset, I can also run a placebo test to check whether there is evidence of a
“treatment effect" before the treatment actually took place. Table A.3 replicates the main
analysis in the paper, the models from columns 4 and 5 of table 1.4, for the turnout change
from 2002-2006 instead of 2006-2010. As discussed above, this data covers a limited number
of places and is likely an undercount of voters, but is the best data available. I do not find
a comparable treatment effect for 2006-2010.
Synthetic control
Next, I address concerns about the comparability of treatment and control units, and
the possibility of extreme counterfactuals, by using synthetic matching (Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller 2010). I use this approach to construct a “synthetic control" for each of
the treated clusters that is a weighted average of other clusters in the dataset.3 I use the
available pre-treatment data – the change in Latino voter turnout in each cluster from 2002-
2006 – to create matches that should have similar time trends in voter turnout. This process
3I perform this matching using the "Synth" package for R (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2011).
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Table A.2: Predicting treatment with prior turnout from CPS
SC treatment
Better data All states
(1) (2)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 1996 25.702 6.761
(20.701) (3.725)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 1998  10.784 0.046
(10.212) (3.448)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 2000 21.766 8.069
(12.640) (5.634)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 2002 3.167  2.645
(7.831) (5.451)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 2004 2.956  2.796
(10.900) (3.683)
Latino Citizen Turnout, 2006  35.302  4.941
(25.346) (3.553)
Constant  13.881  6.122
(7.193) (3.123)
Observations 32 50
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table A.3: Placebo test: main analysis replicated on 2002-2006 treatment change
Turnout change, 2006-2010
(1) (2)
Treatment (Involuntary SC enrollment)  0.038  0.043
(0.045) (0.038)
Senate election 2006 0.063 0.064
(0.026) (0.027)
Senate election 2002  0.007  0.005
(0.027) (0.027)
Governor election 2006 0.043 0.036
(0.024) (0.024)
Constant 0.084 0.089
(0.038) (0.039)
Observations 1548 1548
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Figure A.1: Latino turnout trends in the Current Population Survey. Treated states repre-
sented with thicker lines in both plots.
would be improved by the inclusion of more historical turnout data, but even with limited
data it serves as a check on the difference-in-differences results.
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I draw from the untreated clusters (that is, states without full pre-election SC enrollment,
with any voluntarily-enrolled jurisdictions dropped) to construct matches for each of the
treated clusters. For each cluster, I then compare the change in Latino turnout from 2006 to
2010 between the treated and synthetic control unit. The difference between these changes
is taken as the treatment effect of Secure Communities enrollment. I take the mean of
all treated clusters’ estimates to find an overall estimate of 1.4 percentage points. This is
slightly lower than the 2-3 percentage points estimated in the main analysis in Table 1.4,
but is in the same direction and is of comparable magnitude. As shown in Table A.4, a
mean weighted by the 2006 Latino population of each cluster yields a point estimate of 2.9
percentage points, somewhat larger than the main estimate.4
names ddests
Delaware 0.0415
Florida 0.0041
Virginia 0.0262
Texas -0.0114
West Virginia 0.0084
Mean 0.0138
Population-weighted Mean 0.0290
Unit-weighted Mean 0.0111
Table A.4: Difference-in-difference estimates, compared to synthetic versions of each cluster
The resulting weights for each synthetic match are available on request, and will be
included in the online supplemental information. I have not attempted to quantify the
uncertainty around the estimate produced via synthetic matching, as it is not immediately
clear how to do so with multiple treated units. The results are fairly similar to the OLS
estimates presented in Section 1.4, and so I rely on the better-understood OLS standard
errors, as do other papers using this approach as a check (Hall 2013).
4It may seem that Texas, the only cluster with a negative point estimate, should be weighted more
heavily. But recall that the population used is the Latino population in the cluster after having dropped
places that voluntarily selected into the program. Texas’ major population centers were enrolled into the
SC program quite early.
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B | Appendix to Chapter 1: Analysis of Record
Submissions
One mechanism discussed above was direct experience with deportation: citizens might
observe people they know being deported, and change their political behavior in response.
This is unlikely to explain my results, as I focus on places that enrolled in the program only
a few months before the 2010 election. However, I use available ICE data to ensure that
program implementation in those few months does not explain the turnout results presented
here.
Relatively few people would have been deported due to the Secure Communities program
at the time of the 2010 election, but there is some variation in the number of people whose
fingerprints were submitted to ICE to check their immigration status. In this section, I ex-
plore whether places with different numbers of fingerprint submissions had different political
responses.
To examine whether program implementation affected changes in turnout, I split the
treated units into those with high (above-median) and low (below-median) numbers of fin-
gerprint submissions to ICE, and estimate the SC treatment effect in each subset. ICE
provided data on submissions from the time of program activation until August 2012, so I
adjusted them to reflect the amount of time the program had actually been in effect by the
time of the 2010 election. I assumed that submissions were uniform across the time period
reported, and simply multiplied the total number of submissions by the fraction of activated
time that fell before the 2010 election.1 I divided the treated portion of the sample into units
1This may not be an accurate assumption, but there was no more precise data available on the timing of
fingerprint submissions. Still, I use this assumption only to divide the sample into above- and below-median
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that had sent more than 74 (the sample median) records to ICE prior to the 2010 election,
and those that had submitted fewer than that. These record submissions represent the upper
bound of people who might have faced deportation due to the Secure Communities program
in that jurisdiction– not everyone whose fingerprints were submitted would actually have
been deported, and very few people were likely deported before the 2010 election.
Table B.1: Treatment effects by number of fingerprint submissions (Robust clustered SE’s)
Dependent variable:
Turnout change, 2006-2010
High submissions Low submissions
(1) (2)
Treatment (Involuntary SC enrollment) 0.017 0.031
(0.005) (0.005)
Senate election 2010 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Senate election 2006  0.031  0.031
(0.005) (0.005)
Governor election 2006  0.003  0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Governor election 2006  0.010  0.010
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.028 0.029
(0.009) (0.010)
Observations 2,397 2,398
R2 0.051 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.052
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
jurisdictions on submissions, so even a rough measure should provide a reasonable division. Further, this
analysis is used only to ensure that Secure Communities enrollment is not driving the main results, and
this assumption should, if anything, overestimate the number of people who had direct experience with the
program prior to the election.
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Table B.1 shows the results of this analysis. They support the assertion that personal
experiences with deportation do not drive the turnout effects reported in the main paper.
If individual people were turning out to vote because someone they knew personally was in
danger of deportation, we would expect more record submissions to be associated with more
votes and thus a bigger turnout effect. This is decidedly not the case; as seen in Table 3,
higher-submission communities do not show a larger treatment effect than low-submission
communities.
It should be noted that this is an observational analysis, and we might think that places
with many submissions are different from places with few submissions in many other ways
that could affect turnout and the way the SC program was implemented and perceived.
One such concern is population, but the same pattern of results appears when the analysis
is performed with population-adjusted counts of record submissions (submissions per 1,000
residents, or per 1,000 Latino citizens).
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C | Appendix to Chapter 1: Additional CCES Anal-
ysis
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Table C.1: Respondent-reported campaign/activist contact, 2006 (Latinos)
(1) (2) (3)
SC Treatment  0.059  0.054  0.120
(0.108) (0.110) (0.114)
Registered Voter 0.422 0.428
(0.072) (0.074)
Gender: Female  0.008 0.009
(0.058) (0.056)
Age 0.008 0.008
(0.002) (0.002)
Party ID:Republican 0.121
(0.067)
Party ID: Independent 0.028
(0.056)
Party ID: Other 0.074
(0.148)
Senate Election 2006 0.053
(0.063)
Governor Election 2006 0.064
(0.058)
Constant 0.706  0.029  0.154
(0.027) (0.115) (0.134)
Observations 337 336 336
R2 0.001 0.128 0.143
Adjusted R2  0.002 0.117 0.119
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table C.2: Respondent-reported campaign/activist contact, 2010 (non-Latinos)
(1) (2) (3)
SC Treatment 0.023 0.008 0.006
(0.034) (0.022) (0.024)
Registered Voter 0.297 0.245
(0.008) (0.008)
Gender: Female 0.009 0.008
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Age  0.046  0.035
(0.007) (0.007)
Party ID:Republican 0.031
(0.009)
Party ID: Independent  0.001
(0.008)
Party ID: Other 0.032
(0.019)
Party ID: Not Sure  0.221
(0.012)
Senate Election 2010 0.052
(0.015)
Governor Election 2010 0.060
(0.015)
Constant 0.626  0.031  0.051
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019)
Observations 23,059 23,059 23,059
R2 0.0001 0.152 0.171
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.151 0.171
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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D | Appendix to Chapter 2: Random Assignment
to Courtrooms
As discussed in the main paper, the court has a stated policy of random assignment of
cases to courtrooms, done by a computer in the clerk’s office. However, here I perform some
checks to make sure the data looks as if cases were indeed assigned to courtrooms without
regard to defendant or case characteristics.
Figure 2.1 in the paper demonstrates that the 15 courtrooms appear to have fairly similar
caseloads on defendant and case characteristics, such as race, gender, and charge severity.
Next, I test for that similarity more formally in several ways.
I begin by regressing several key pre-treatment characteristics onto courtroom assign-
ment dummies.1 I try to predict defendants’ characteristics using courtroom assignment: if
I could predict gender or race from people’s assigned courtroom, that would suggest some
systematic variation in courtrooms’ caseloads. Table D.1 then presents F-statistics from
these models. For pre-assignment characteristics like age or sex, the F-statistics are rela-
tively small (some represent technical rejection of the null hypothesis, but represent very
small substantive differences on these characteristics). This is as we would expect from ran-
dom assignment. However, at the bottom of the table I regress sentencing outcomes onto
courtroom assignment and find much larger F-statistics. This demonstrates that, as shown
in Figure 2.1, courtrooms do not differ much on their cases’ pre-assignment covariates (ran-
dom assignment), but they differ a great deal in the sentences they give out to defendants
(sentencing variation). This makes courtroom assignment a useful instrument for sentencing
1So “Courtroom1" is one if a person was assigned to courtroom 1 and zero otherwise, etc.
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harshness.
Table D.1: Testing Court Caseload Differences
Variable F-Statistic
Male 1.27
Black 1.4
Age 1.39
Conviction 7.77
Fine 23.54
Probation 11.01
Jail 7.53
Jail Time 14.12
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Next, I do some permutation tests for the main continuous pre-treatment variable that
is available in these court records: age.2 We might worry that courtrooms’ caseloads would
have the same mean defendant age, but perhaps have different distributions. In Figure D,
I plot both the courtrooms’ actual age distributions as well as a set of many possible age
distributions that could have arisen from random assignment. I begin with the actual (ob-
served) distribution of cases to courtrooms. Then, I permute this data 100 times, each time
“shuﬄing" the courtroom assignment of all defendants without consideration for defendant
or case characteristics. For each of these “random-assignment" datasets, I plot the age dis-
tribution for each courtroom in gray. This gives us a sense for the possible range of age
distributions that could have been observed under true random assignment. Then, atop this
set of possibilities, I plot the observed age distribution for each courtroom. These actual
distributions fall squarely within the range of possible distributions that could arise under
random assignment.
2Court records contain relatively few covariates about defendants, and most are binary or categorical:
gender, race, hair and eye color.
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E | Appendix to Chapter 2: Table of Courtroom
Caseloads
Table E.1: Defendant Characteristics by Courtroom, 2008-2012
Court Total Pct. Male Pct. Black Pct.>30 Pct. Jailed Pct.Voted2012
1 7; 606 0:697 0:268 0:338 0:517 0:131
2 7; 558 0:694 0:277 0:342 0:587 0:121
3 7; 453 0:697 0:285 0:340 0:513 0:125
4 7; 604 0:701 0:277 0:348 0:533 0:128
5 7; 570 0:707 0:280 0:340 0:537 0:128
6 7; 545 0:697 0:282 0:355 0:502 0:123
7 7; 442 0:702 0:274 0:343 0:497 0:125
8 7; 591 0:691 0:273 0:333 0:551 0:132
9 7; 674 0:691 0:283 0:342 0:528 0:131
10 7; 615 0:698 0:275 0:344 0:545 0:129
11 7; 691 0:687 0:277 0:348 0:530 0:119
12 7; 512 0:694 0:286 0:341 0:527 0:127
13 7; 513 0:691 0:268 0:340 0:534 0:125
14 7; 565 0:693 0:284 0:346 0:555 0:129
15 7; 476 0:692 0:280 0:353 0:528 0:130
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F | Appendix to Chapter 2: Regression Table from
Figure 2.2
Table F.1: IV estimates: Jail sentences on voting, by race
Dependent variable:
vote2012
Black Defendants White Defendants
(1) (2)
jail  0.134  0.006
(0.056) (0.036)
Constant 0.263 0.091
(0.031) (0.022)
Year dummies Yes Yes
First Stage F-Statistic 52.99 64.55
Observations 31,524 77,779
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.003
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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G | Appendix to Chapter 2: Map of Harris County
Harris County, Texas
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H | Appendix to Chapter 2: Identifying Hispanic
Defendants by Surname
The court records used for this project identify defendant race as Black/White/Asian/Native
American/uncategorized/other, grouping Hispanic defendants into the white category. In
this appendix, I attempt to identify Hispanic defendants using lists of spanish surnames
from the US Census.
Taking a fairly simple approach to surname classification, I began with Census 2000 data
on surnames belonging to over 100 people.1 If this Census dataset indicates that 90% or
more of people holding that surname identified as Hispanic or Latino on the Census, I use
that name to indicate Hispanic/Latino identity in my dataset of defendants. Thus, this is
a loose categorization: many people may identify as Hispanic or Latino but have surnames
that are not on this list.
Using this surname list, I identify 29,582 defendants (of the 77,787 listed as “White" in
the court records) as Hispanic, likely an undercount.2 As I did in the main paper with white
and black defendants, I split the dataset to construct the courtroom-sentencing instrument
and run the IV analysis separately on Hispanic and Anglo defendants. When running the
analysis this way, I find evidence of substantial demobilization among Hispanic defendants.
The IV estimates in column 2 of Table H.1 indicate that jail caused an almost 11-percentage-
point drop in turnout for Hispanic defendants. Column 4 suggests a small, but insignificant
1Downloaded from http://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/2000surnames/names.zip in June 2015.
2A small number of defendants classified as other races also had surnames from this list. I omit them
from this analysis due to concerns about double-counting defendants by including them in multiple analysis
groups.
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positive effect for Anglo defendants (or, to be more precise, white defendants without sur-
names that clearly indicate Hispanic identity). However, when I run an interactive model
(using the instrument calculated in the full dataset, and adding an interaction term be-
tween jail sentencing and Hispanic identity), there is not a significant difference between the
Hispanic and Anglo defendants’ jail effects.3
Table H.1: IV estimates: Jail sentences on voting, Latino (Columns 1-2) and Anglo (Columns 3-4) defendants
Dependent variable:
jail vote2012 jail vote2012
OLS instrumental OLS instrumental
variable variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Courtroom instrument 1.000 1.000
(0.088) (0.068)
Jail  0.107  0.013
(0.042) (0.044)
Constant 0.000 0.118  0.000 0.119
(0.058) (0.028) (0.039) (0.025)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,582 29,582 48,205 48,205
F Statistic 29.824 56.270
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
3See the SI for this table.
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I | Appendix to Chapter 3: Checking for House-
hold Relationships
This project assumes that voters and criminal defendants living at the same geographic coordinates
(according to public records) know each other, and will often have some sort of familial or romantic relation-
ship. I check this by drawing a random sample of observations from my dataset and verifying that many of
the households do appear to include such relationships.
I first run this check for households of 2012 defendants. I randomly sample 100 rows from the nearly
18,000-person sample. Then, for each row, I investigate the relationship between the registered voter and
the criminal defendant who live at this address. First, I check whether they share a last name; this is a fairly
conservative measure of family relationships, as many people may be related but not share a surname (and
the probability of coincidences in which people report the same residential address and share a last name but
are not related seems low). 47% of households contain voters and defendants that share a last name. This
is quite high, considering that many romantic partners in this sample may be unmarried (Western 2006).
Next, for households that do not share a last name, I look for other evidence of connections in public
records of marriages and births. By looking up defendants’ and voters’ names in the Texas state birth
index from 1907-1993 (searchable through Familysearch.org), I find evidence of parent-child relationships,
shared children, or shared parents (sibling relationships) for an additional 10 % of observations. A number
of other observations appear to be related (age gaps suggest parent-child or parent-grandchild relationships,
and naming similarities suggest a familial link), but could not be verified using public records and are not
counted here.
Thus, I find strong evidence of close familial relationships for 57 % of observations. This is quite high,
as it does not capture people cohabiting without children in common, and may also not capture parent-child
relationships for people born outside Texas, not to mention close friends or other relatives. To the extent
that some of the remaining observations introduce error to the analyses by inaccurately classifying strangers
or neighbors as household members, this should make the estimates in the paper conservative ones.
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J | Appendix to Chapter 3: Including Fixed Ef-
fects and Census Data
Table J.1: OLS estimates with geographic fixed effects
Dependent variable:
vote2012
(1) (2) (3)
Household Member Jailed  0:021  0:023  0:023
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
2008 Turnout 0:471 0:473 0:473
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Voter Male  0:043  0:043  0:043
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Voter Age (Years) 0:001 0:001 0:001
(0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001)
Constant 0:212 0:252 0:252
(0:065) (0:009) (0:009)
Zip Code Fixed Effects X
State House District Fixed Effects X
State Senate District Fixed Effects X
Observations 86,241 86,241 86,241
R2 0.248 0.245 0.245
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.245 0.245
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table J.2: OLS estimates including census tract characteristics
Dependent variable:
vote2012
Household Member Jailed  0:021
(0:003)
2008 Turnout 0:471
(0:003)
Voter Male  0:043
(0:003)
Voter Age (Years) 0:001
(0:0001)
Tract Population 0:00000
(0:00000)
Tract Percent Latino  0:116
(0:009)
Tract Percent Black 0:016
(0:007)
Tract Average Household Size 0:001
(0:004)
Constant 0:293
(0:012)
Observations 86,241
R2 0.246
Adjusted R2 0.246
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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K | Appendix to Chapter 3: Instrumental Vari-
ables
Table K.1 shows first-stage results for several different ways of constructing the instrument. Column 1
shows the regression of the treatment of interest (household member jail) onto all but one of the individual
dummy variables for courtroom assignment (as in Green and Winik (2010)). Column 2 takes the same
approach, but interacts the courtroom dummies with the filing year of the cases, to account for possible
non-monotonicity (some courtrooms may be more harsh than others one year, but not the next)(Mueller-
Smith 2014). Note that courtroom-year interaction terms are omitted from the table for parsimony; full
table available on request. Column 3 presents the first stage using the courtroom’s jail-sentencing rate as an
instrument (that is, I calculated the proportion of all first-time misdemeanor defendants that were sentenced
to jail by that courtroom, regardless of whether those defendants lived with any registered voters or not), and
Column 4 does the same thing but calculates jail sentencing rates within-year (again due to non-monotonicity
concerns)(Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013). In all cases, the F-statistic is above 10. In the supplemental
appendix, I will also construct leave-one-out courtroom sentencing means to use as instruments.
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Table K.1: First Stage: Predicting Jail with Courtroom Assignment
Dependent variable:
anyjail
(1) (2) (3) (4)
crt_2 0:099  28:093
(0:009) (13:197)
crt_3 0:029 18:525
(0:009) (13:223)
crt_4 0:027 21:122
(0:009) (13:117)
crt_5 0:034  15:025
(0:009) (13:395)
crt_6 0:001  10:496
(0:009) (13:280)
crt_7 0:015  11:364
(0:009) (13:253)
crt_8 0:043  2:340
(0:009) (13:022)
crt_9 0:038  0:200
(0:009) (13:447)
crt_10 0:050  35:367
(0:009) (13:169)
crt_11 0:042 33:143
(0:009) (13:289)
crt_12 0:024 35:237
(0:009) (13:158)
crt_13 0:055  12:049
(0:009) (13:160)
crt_14 0:068  59:935
(0:009) (13:207)
crt_15 0:011  17:943
(0:009) (13:239)
fyear  0:004
(0:005)
crtjailavgd 1:104
(0:080)
crtjailavg1 1:140
(0:046)
Constant 0:401 7:779  0:133  0:152
(0:007) (9:325) (0:041) (0:024)
Year-Courtroom Interactions X
Observations 87,591 87,591 87,591 87,591
R2 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.007
F Statistic 16.114 (df = 14; 87576 11.446 190.255 617.622
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01112
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